

This chapter describes the environmental setting and study area for flood protection; analyzes impacts that could result from construction, operation, and maintenance of the Delta Conveyance Project (project); and provides mitigation measures to reduce the effects of potentially significant impacts. This chapter also analyzes the impacts that could result from implementation of compensatory mitigation required for the project and describes any additional mitigation necessary to reduce those impacts, and analyzes the impacts that could result from other mitigation measures associated with other resource chapters in this Draft EIR. The flood protection resources considered are flood management systems (including State Water Project [SWP] and Central Valley Project [CVP] flood control reservoirs and downstream channels), drainage patterns and runoff flows, and flood flows in the study area.

## 7.0 Summary Comparison of Flood Protection Impacts by Project Alternatives

Table 7-0 provides a summary comparison of impacts on flood protection by project alternative. The table presents the CEQA findings after all mitigation is applied. If applicable, the table also presents quantitative results after all mitigation is applied.

Consistent with the evaluation of potential impacts on other resources, the qualitative and quantitative analyses discussed in this section assess the significance of project impacts in relation to existing conditions. All project alternatives are for water supply purposes and with exception of modification to levees at intake locations, include no changes in flood management infrastructure in the Sacramento River Basin and in the Delta, including the reservoirs of the SWP and CVP, and associated flood operation rules and management which contribute to the flood protection afforded by the Sacramento River Flood Control Project (SRFCP). Therefore, the impacts from project alternatives were evaluated for flood protection of nearby urban and nonurban areas along the reach of the Sacramento River from the American River confluence to Sutter Slough, where the drainage of floodwater may be affected by the construction and operation of the intakes. Potential impacts from project facilities impeding or redirecting localized flood flow were also evaluated. All of these impacts are contained in the Delta, which constitute the study area. The analysis of flood-related impacts included a quantitative and qualitative approach, depending on the location where these impacts may occur. These two categories of analysis require different settings to accommodate the different regulatory frameworks associated with applicable flood management practices. This section provides a summary of these two categories of impact assessments including the reasons for selecting the associated existing conditions and No Project Alternative, and the resulting flood control impacts.

The assessment of potential flood control impacts on the passage of floodwater in the Sacramento River was conducted to be consistent with the *2022 Central Valley Flood Protection Plan (CVFPP) Update (2022 CVFPP Update)* (California Department of Water Resources 2022a), based on consultation with the Central Valley Flood Protection Board (CVFPB). Consistency with the 2022 CVFPP Update is important because the channel and levees of this section of the Sacramento River

1 are part of the State Plan of Flood Control (SPFC) as defined in California Water Code (Wat. Code)  
2 Section 9110(f). The 2022 CVFPP Update, which is the long-term plan for areas protected by the  
3 SPFC, has a 50-year planning horizon from 2022 for analysis purposes and for developing  
4 assessment strategy. Therefore, the analysis for potential flood control impacts on the area  
5 protected by the SPFC was conducted using a similar approach and planning horizon. To maintain  
6 consistency with the regulatory and planning purposes, flood control impact analyses along the  
7 Sacramento River protected by the SPFC used the years 2022 and 2072 as reference years for  
8 existing conditions and the No Project Alternative, respectively. This change from the approach used  
9 in other resource assessments (existing conditions at 2020 and No Project at 2040) is considered  
10 necessary for the flood control impact assessment to be consistent with the SPFC.

11 The nature of the proposed north Delta intake structures requires placement along the bank of the  
12 Sacramento River, with a portion of the structure projecting into the flowing water. This could  
13 effectively constrict the conveyance capacity of the river along the respective length of each intake,  
14 resulting in a rise in water surface elevation (WSE) upstream of the intakes. The corresponding WSE  
15 increase is dependent on the combination of intakes used to achieve project needs, the facility  
16 configuration, and the phase of construction for each intake.

17 Hydraulic analyses examined the effect of the project on WSEs in the Sacramento River between the  
18 American River confluence and Sutter Slough. The effects of the intakes on the WSE are expected to  
19 only occur within this reach of the Sacramento River. This reach of the river, which includes urban  
20 levees extending south from the American River confluence to around the location of the Freeport  
21 Regional Water Authority intake, protects Sacramento urban areas; these areas are subject to Urban  
22 Level of Flood Protection (i.e., 200-year level of flood protection). The rest of the levees further  
23 downstream along the Sacramento River are considered rural levees or nonurban levees that are  
24 not subject to the Urban Level of Flood Protection. Therefore, for completeness of the assessment  
25 for each project alternative, it was necessary to evaluate the impacts on WSEs of the Sacramento  
26 River for 100- and 200-year flood events under existing conditions (i.e., 2022 conditions) and future  
27 conditions (i.e., 2072 conditions) with climate change, including corresponding hydrologic change  
28 and sea level rise. The results of the hydraulic analyses indicate that WSE increases in the  
29 Sacramento River between the American River confluence and Sutter Slough during the 100-year  
30 and 200-year flood events would result in a less-than-significant impact on flood protection during  
31 construction and during operations with permanent facilities, except that Alternatives 2a and 4a,  
32 where all three intakes are used, would increase Sacramento River WSE upstream of the intakes  
33 between 0.11 and 0.12 foot during construction and result in a significant impact. Mitigation  
34 Measure FP-1: *Phased Construction of the Proposed North Delta Intakes* would reduce the magnitude  
35 of WSE increases during the 100-year and 200-year flood event to a less than significant level.

36 The assessment for potential flood protection impacts from the permanent project facilities during  
37 operations was also evaluated using flood flows consistent with those used to develop the 1957 U.S.  
38 Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Sacramento River Project Levee design profiles. The 1957 design  
39 profile assessment is required by USACE and CVFPB as part of their corresponding permitting  
40 process for the project to demonstrate that project operations would not impede the continued  
41 functions of the levees and channels as originally designed. The 1957 levee design profiles were not  
42 considered as part of the CEQA impact assessment because the CEQA impact thresholds used by the  
43 California Department of Water Resources (DWR) in this Draft EIR are more stringent than the 1957  
44 profiles. The details and results of the analysis using the 1957 levee profiles are provided in  
45 Appendix 7B, *Evaluation against U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1957 Design Profiles*.

1 For the impact assessment on localized flood flow impacts from various project facilities, an  
2 approach consistent with the assessment of other resources in this Draft EIR was applied. This  
3 portion of the flood assessment compared changes in conditions resulting from the project with  
4 existing conditions. Existing conditions include existing facilities and ongoing programs that existed  
5 as of January 15, 2020 (i.e., the publication date of the Notice of Preparation). The No Project  
6 Alternative includes reasonably foreseeable changes in existing conditions (such as sea level rise  
7 and climate change) and changes that would be expected to occur in the year 2040 if the project  
8 were not approved.

9 The project would include permanent facilities within the 100-year flood hazard area and therefore,  
10 where necessary to protect the water conveyance infrastructure from flooding, facilities would be  
11 conservatively designed to withstand a 200-year flood event with projected climate change  
12 hydrology for 2100 and extreme sea level rise during operations (Delta Conveyance Design and  
13 Construction Authority 2022a:62, 2022b:42). For launch shaft sites at Bouldin and Lower Roberts  
14 Islands, the levees would be improved to meet the Delta-specific Public Law (PL) 84-99 standards,  
15 where applicable, which is an improvement to existing conditions. As a result, these areas would be  
16 out of the 100-year flood hazard area due to the levee improvement, alleviating the need to assess  
17 potential impacts on local flood flows. This approach was not proposed for the Twin Cities Complex  
18 and therefore, a two-dimensional (2-D) hydraulic analysis for the Twin Cities Complex was  
19 conducted. The analysis showed limited increases in flood depth and area around the Twin Cities  
20 Complex during construction (which includes a ring levee to minimize impacts on the surrounding  
21 lands) and operations. The flood effects analysis for the Twin Cities Complex site found that the ring  
22 levee (during construction) and stockpile storage areas (during operations) for all project  
23 alternatives would increase the 100-year flood depth by a maximum of approximately 0.4 foot and  
24 would increase the 100-year floodplain by approximately 15 acres when compared to existing  
25 conditions (i.e., 2022 conditions). The ring levee associated with construction at the Twin Cities  
26 Complex site exhibited the largest increases to the depth and areal extent of the 100-year flood  
27 event. The extent and change of the maximum WSE during a 100-year flood event was considered a  
28 less-than-significant impact. All launch, maintenance, and reception shaft sites would enact  
29 nonstructural flood risk management measures.

30 The Southern Forebay is not located in the 100-year flood hazard zone and would be designed in  
31 accordance with DWR Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD) requirements for jurisdictional dams  
32 based on the anticipated maximum embankment height and storage volume. The Southern Forebay  
33 includes an overflow emergency spillway that would be used in the unlikely condition that the  
34 forebay water level continued to rise above the design maximum elevation. The emergency spillway  
35 would discharge flow from the Southern Forebay into Italian Slough, which flows into Old River. To  
36 accommodate this, a portion of the existing Italian Slough levee would be removed. New levees  
37 would be constructed to channelize and contain the spillway discharge flows between the outboard  
38 toe of the spillway and the existing levee along Italian Slough. The discharge into Italian Slough  
39 would initially be contained within the slough's existing levees but would, over a short distance,  
40 converge with Old River. The connection to Old River and the broader Delta waterways would allow  
41 spillway flows to be absorbed during any emergency discharge.

42 The potential hydraulic impact of the Southern Forebay Emergency Spillway on the existing levee  
43 system of Italian Slough and Old River was evaluated using a one-dimensional (1-D) hydraulic  
44 model. The change in WSEs was compared between the different operational scenarios (i.e., spillway  
45 releases of 3,000, 4,500, 6,000, and 7,500 cubic feet per second [cfs]) and the baseline (i.e., no spill  
46 event). The 7,500 cfs scenario exhibited the largest increases in WSEs when compared to the

1 baseline for both the 100-year flood event and the mean higher high water event (Delta Conveyance  
2 Design and Construction Authority 2022c:Att 2-5). For the 100-year flood event, the 7,500 cfs  
3 scenario increased WSEs by 0.44 foot when compared to the baseline with the affected area  
4 extending 2.47 miles upstream and 1.55 miles downstream of the spillway location. For the mean  
5 higher high water event, the 7,500 cfs scenario increased WSEs by 0.67 foot when compared to the  
6 baseline with the affected area extending 2.47 miles upstream and 1.94 miles downstream of the  
7 spillway location. Although the spillway was assumed to flow for 12 hours, peak WSEs were  
8 achieved in 2 hours or less for the scenarios modeled. In the scenarios modeled, the peak WSE was  
9 located upstream of the spillway location due to backwater effects from the additional flow entering  
10 Italian Slough from the spillway. None of the scenarios analyzed resulted in overtopping levees of  
11 the main Italian Slough channel or Old River due to the releases from the Southern Forebay  
12 Emergency Spillway.

13 Constructions of the facilities under various project alternatives involve excavation, grading,  
14 stockpiling, soil compaction, and dewatering that could result in alterations to runoff, drainage  
15 patterns, erosion, stream courses, and WSEs during construction of facilities. All project features  
16 would be constructed to not increase peak runoff flows into adjacent storm drains, drainage ditches,  
17 or rivers and sloughs. All surface water runoff and dewatering flows or additional runoff during  
18 construction would be captured, treated, stored, and, if possible, reused on-site. If additional stored  
19 water is not needed, the treated runoff flows would be released in a manner that would not increase  
20 peak WSEs in adjacent channels. Shallow flooding has historically occurred at the sites of the  
21 proposed north Delta intakes due to natural depressions. Therefore, the project alternatives include  
22 drainage and pump enhancements to ensure intake facilities would not be subject to flooding during  
23 operation. During construction, the local drainage at intake facility sites would be managed to  
24 minimize local flooding through installing temporary pumps if necessary to allow continued  
25 construction activities. Because drainage and pump enhancements are included in facility design,  
26 the potential impacts of localized flooding at the intakes would be minimized. Overall, the project  
27 alternatives would have less-than-significant impacts on existing drainage patterns of the facility  
28 site or surrounding area.

29 Table 7-0 summarizes the comparison of impacts on flood protection by project alternatives  
30 disclosed in this chapter.

1 **Table 7-0. Comparison of Impacts on Flood Protection by Project Alternative**

Chapter 7 – Flood Protection	Project Alternative								
	1	2a	2b	2c	3	4a	4b	4c	5
Impact FP-1: Cause a Substantial Increase in Water Surface Elevations of the Sacramento River between the American River Confluence and Sutter Slough	LTS	S (LTS with mitigation)	LTS	LTS	LTS	S (LTS with mitigation)	LTS	LTS	LTS
<b>Construction Phase</b>									
River Reaches with Urban Levees – Max WSE Difference Relative to EC (feet) <i>100-Year Flood Event</i>	0.08	0.10	≤0.08	≤0.08	0.08	0.10	≤0.08	≤0.08	0.08
River Reaches with Urban Levees – Max WSE Difference Relative to EC (feet) <i>200-Year Flood Event</i>	0.08	0.10	≤0.08	≤0.08	0.08	0.10	≤0.08	≤0.08	0.08
River Reaches with Nonurban Levees – Max WSE Difference Relative to EC (feet) <i>100-Year Flood Event</i>	0.10	0.11	≤0.10	≤0.10	0.10	0.11	≤0.10	≤0.10	0.10
River Reaches with Nonurban Levees – Max WSE Difference Relative to EC (feet) <i>100-Year Flood Event with Mitigation</i>	N/A	0.09	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.09	N/A	N/A	N/A
River Reaches with Nonurban Levees – Max WSE Difference Relative to EC (feet) <i>200-Year Flood Event</i>	0.10	0.12	≤0.10	≤0.10	0.10	0.12	≤0.10	≤0.10	0.10
River Reaches with Nonurban Levees – Max WSE Difference Relative to EC (feet) <i>200-Year Flood Event with Mitigation</i>	N/A	0.09	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.09	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>Operations Phase</b>									
River Reaches with Urban Levees – Maximum WSE Difference Relative to EC (feet) <i>100-Year Flood Event</i>	0.04	0.05	≤0.04	≤0.04	0.04	0.05	≤0.04	≤0.04	0.04
River Reaches with Urban Levees – Maximum WSE Difference Relative to EC (feet) <i>200-Year Flood Event</i>	0.04	0.05	≤0.04	≤0.04	0.04	0.05	≤0.04	≤0.04	0.04

Chapter 7 – Flood Protection	Project Alternative								
	1	2a	2b	2c	3	4a	4b	4c	5
River Reaches with Nonurban Levees – Maximum WSE Difference Relative to EC (feet) <i>100-Year Flood Event</i>	0.04	0.05	≤0.04	≤0.04	0.04	0.05	≤0.04	≤0.04	0.04
River Reaches with Nonurban Levees – Maximum WSE Difference Relative to EC (feet) <i>200-Year Flood Event</i>	0.04	0.05	≤0.04	≤0.04	0.04	0.05	≤0.04	≤0.04	0.04
Impact FP-2: Alter the Existing Drainage Pattern of the Site or Area, including through the Alteration of the Course of a Stream or River, or Substantially Increase the Rate or Amount of Surface Runoff in a Manner That Would Result in Flooding On- or Off-Site or Impede or Redirect Flood Flows	LTS	LTS	LTS	LTS	LTS	LTS	LTS	LTS	LTS

- 1 Note: Alternatives 2b, 2c, 4b, and 4c (3,000-cfs and 4,500-cfs capacity alternatives) were not modeled since WSE impacts would be similar to, or less than, the  
2 corresponding alternatives of the same alignment but larger capacity (i.e., Alternatives 1 and 3 [6,000-cfs capacity alternatives]).  
3 cfs = cubic feet per second; EC = existing conditions; N/A = not applicable; WSE = water surface elevation; LTS = less than significant; S = significant.

## 7.1 Environmental Setting

This section describes flood risks, flood management, and flood management facilities within the study area that could be affected by construction, operation, and maintenance of the project.

Flood protection is related to surface water resources discussed in Chapter 5, *Surface Water*, which describes Sacramento and San Joaquin River Basin hydrology, and the hydrology of the Delta. Chapter 6, *Water Supply*, describes SRFCP and CVP facilities and their operation, including facilities with specific flood-management responsibilities.

### 7.1.1 Study Area

The study area, defined as the area in which impacts may occur, primarily comprises the statutory Delta (or legal Delta)—as defined by Wat. Code Section 12220—as well as areas southwest and east of the legal Delta to include the facility footprints associated with Bethany Reservoir (for Alternative 5) and the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Fiber Route (for all project alternatives) near the proposed north Delta intakes, respectively. The study area includes portions of Sacramento, Yolo, San Joaquin, Contra Costa, and Alameda Counties. The assessments for potential flood control impact from the project alternatives focus on the legal Delta as well as the immediate area east of the Delta for the SCADA Fiber Route because the area around Bethany Reservoir is outside of the floodplain (Figure 7-1).

The Delta covers approximately 1,300 square miles and is a complex network of channels, levees, subsided islands, sloughs, rivers, and tributaries that is located at the confluence of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers (Delta Stewardship Council 2021:1-3). The Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers are the two biggest contributors to Delta inflows, with additional inflows being provided by tributaries to the east (i.e., Mokelumne, Cosumnes, and Calaveras Rivers). Historically, the natural Delta system was formed by water inflows from upstream tributaries in the Delta watershed and outflows to Suisun Bay and San Francisco Bay. In the late 1800s, local land reclamation efforts in the Delta resulted in the construction of channels and levees that began altering the Delta's surface water flows. Over time, the natural pattern of water flows continued to change as the result of upper watershed diversions and the construction of facilities to divert and export water through the Delta to areas where supplemental water supplies are needed. Chapter 5 includes a more detailed description of the Sacramento and San Joaquin River Basins and their influence on the Delta.

Because the area around Bethany Reservoir is outside of the floodplain, and the impact assessment focuses on the legal Delta, the area around the Bethany Reservoir Discharge Structure is not addressed in this analysis. The Delta includes many federal, state, regional, and local flood management facilities, including levee systems, bypasses, floodways, weirs, and other pertinent facilities. The construction or operations of the project alternatives would not affect these flood management facilities and do not include any changes in flood control operations. Flood control operation and associated rules are under the jurisdiction of USACE. Therefore, the operations of project alternatives would have no impacts on flood protection upstream of the Delta, and the level of flood protection under project alternatives would remain the same. Since the project would not affect the Sacramento River upstream of the Delta or the San Joaquin River Basin outside of the Delta, the study area associated with flood protection focuses on the specific areas in the Delta that may be affected by project facilities—including the intakes, launch/maintenance/reception shafts,




1 and Southern Forebay (although the latter is applicable to Alternatives 1, 2a, 2b, 2c, 3, 4a, 4b, and 4c  
2 only). The proposed intakes are on the Sacramento River and the flow at intake locations are subject  
3 to the operation of upstream flood management facilities including the reservoirs of the SRFCP,  
4 SWP, and CVP. However, the effects of project alternatives on flows in the Sacramento River are  
5 expected to be minimal upstream of the American River confluence (see later sections for more  
6 discussion). Therefore, flood control and management facilities on the Sacramento River upstream  
7 of the American River confluence are only discussed briefly to provide context and references for  
8 discussing the existing flood management in the Delta. A more detailed description of the surface  
9 reservoirs, conveyance systems, and water diversion facilities in the Sacramento and San Joaquin  
10 River Basins can be found in Chapter 5.

## 11 **7.1.2 Areas Subject to Flooding**

12 The Delta, as part of the estuary formed by the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers, is an inherently  
13 flood-prone area. Fluctuations in Delta WSEs are often entirely driven by high discharge events in  
14 upstream areas of the Delta tributaries (i.e., the Sacramento River, San Joaquin River, and eastside  
15 tributaries discussed above). Delta WSE variations are heavily influenced by additional factors,  
16 including astronomical tides and atmospheric effects (pressure and wind); the effects of these  
17 processes decrease with distance into the Delta and along the river channels as riverine inflows  
18 become more dominant. Generally, the tidal influence can extend to the Sacramento River near  
19 Sacramento, and the San Joaquin River between Mossdale Bridge and Vernalis. Fluvial inflow,  
20 salinity control operations, and Delta exports also affect Delta WSEs, although these effects tend to  
21 be localized in non-flooding conditions.

22 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is a primary source of current flood risk  
23 information. FEMA uses Flood Insurance Studies to produce Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs).  
24 Probability of flooding is defined by the probability that a flood may occur in any given year. For  
25 example, a 100-year flood is a flood that has a 1% chance of occurring in any given year, or more  
26 formally, a 1% chance of annual exceedance probability (AEP). FEMA refers to areas that are subject  
27 to inundation by the 1% AEP flood as Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs). Figure 7-1 shows  
28 floodplains in the Delta that have a 1% AEP (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2020). The  
29 Delta spans numerous FIRM panels and contains several FEMA flood zones. FEMA FIRMs indicate  
30 that much of the central Delta—essentially all of the nonurban Delta—is within SFHAs and  
31 considered to be subject to flooding with 1% AEP. Encroachments within these flood zones are  
32 subject to federal, state, and local regulatory requirements. The federal regulatory requirements  
33 represent the minimum level of compliance needed, while state and local requirements may be  
34 more stringent. FEMA continues to evaluate floodplain delineations as needed based on continued  
35 hydrology changes that may affect the AEP frequency calculation and additional evaluation of facility  
36 conditions and improvement.





(a) CENTRAL ALIGNMENT ALTERNATIVES

(b) EASTERN ALIGNMENT ALTERNATIVES

(c) BETHANY RESERVOIR ALIGNMENT ALTERNATIVES

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2

Figure 7-1 FEMA Floodplains for a 1% AEP Flood in the Delta

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1 For the assessment of potential impacts from project alternatives on local flood flows, the Delta's  
2 100-year floodplain is generally considered the extent of the study area; however, the area subject  
3 to flooding is greater than shown in Figure 7-1 during a more significant flood event. Separate  
4 considerations are required to address the potential flood management impacts on the greater flood  
5 management system that resides in the part of the Delta near the proposed north Delta intakes.  
6 Detailed analyses are not needed in areas with reduced flood risks due to levee improvement  
7 because those areas are functionally out of the 100-year floodplain based on FEMA's National Flood  
8 Insurance Program (NFIP). The location of the project facilities within the floodplain warrants  
9 evaluation of potential flood impacts from proposed facility plans. As shown in Figure 7-1, the  
10 majority of the facilities proposed for the project alternatives are within the 100-year (i.e., 1% AEP)  
11 floodplain in the Delta—Bethany Reservoir Pumping Plant being the most notable project feature  
12 that is not. While the SCADA Fiber Route is not within the legal Delta, a significant portion of the  
13 facility footprint is within the 100-year floodplain. Figure 7-1 also depicts "Area[s] of Reduced  
14 Risk"—a FEMA designation that describes an area with a levee where the risk of being flooded is  
15 reduced, but not completely removed. FEMA does not delineate floodplains for floods smaller than  
16 the 1% AEP, such as the 2% and 10% AEP (50- and 10-year, respectively) flood events.

17 Delta flooding could interrupt the conveyance of water through the Delta for the SWP, the CVP,  
18 in-Delta users, the Contra Costa Water District, the cities of Antioch and Stockton, and others relying  
19 on the Delta for water supplies (Delta Stewardship Council 2020:5). Levee failures could also  
20 damage key features of the Delta ecosystem existing on the heavily altered landscape, including  
21 managed wetlands in Suisun Marsh and habitats of wintering greater sandhill cranes at Staten  
22 Island and nearby tracts. Moreover, levee failure could degrade Delta water quality if waters rush  
23 into a heavily subsided Delta island, pulling higher-salinity water (from the western Delta) into the  
24 central Delta. Because the elevations of many Delta islands are below sea level, these failures would  
25 draw salt water from San Francisco Bay and introduce additional pollutants into Delta water with  
26 flood debris, farm chemicals, and others.

27 Some generalizations can be made about the geographic differences in the nature of the flood  
28 threats in the various regions of the Delta, including the following.

- 29 • North and South Delta: The flood risks in both the north and south Delta are more related to the  
30 storm events in the Sacramento and San Joaquin River Basins, depending on the combination of  
31 factors including the intensity and volume of rainfall and if the temperature would be warm  
32 enough to trigger early snowmelt, adding additional volume into the channels. These conditions  
33 can increase the risk of levee failures due to scour, seepage, and slumping. For these reasons,  
34 north and south Delta receive protection from flood control systems established for the  
35 Sacramento and San Joaquin River systems. Occasionally, extended periods of snowmelt,  
36 extending into June and July, may affect north and south Delta, but the flooding effects are more  
37 localized in upstream areas.
- 38 • Flood concerns in the north Delta are particularly acute. The combined flood flows of the  
39 Morrison Stream Group, Dry Creek, the Cosumnes River, and the Mokelumne River converge and  
40 accumulate because the downstream Delta channels lack the capacity to convey the combined  
41 flow (which can be exacerbated by high tidal conditions) to the Sacramento and San Joaquin  
42 Rivers. River stages rise until levees give way or are overtopped, which occurred in 1986. During  
43 that flood event, the levees failed on McCormack-Williamson Tract, Glanville Tract, Dead Horse  
44 Island, and Tyler Island sequentially over a period of hours on the afternoon and evening of  
45 February 18, 1986, followed by a levee failure on New Hope Tract.

- 1 • West Delta: In the west Delta region, high water stages due to tides and total Delta inflow  
2 (especially from the Yolo Bypass) and high winds could result in extreme wave wash erosion,  
3 displacement of riprap, and waves overtopping the levees. Deep peat and weak foundations  
4 combined with island interiors well below sea level could contribute to the structural stresses on  
5 west Delta levees.

### 6 **7.1.3 Factors That Influence Flood Risk in the Study Area**

7 California's Central Valley, including the Delta, is a broad, gently sloping valley formed by the  
8 Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers. The lower-lying lands along these two rivers and the Delta were  
9 once floodplains and marshlands that were regularly inundated for long periods during large,  
10 seasonal flood events before reclamation (California Department of Water Resources 2012a:1-2).  
11 The history of flood management in the Central Valley can be traced back to the mid-1800s. More  
12 than 1 million people are now living in the Central Valley floodplain where major flood events in  
13 1983, 1986, 1995, and 1997 created cumulative flood damage estimated in excess of \$3 billion  
14 (California Department of Water Resources 2012a:1-1). The Central Valley Flood Control Project  
15 management system includes levees along the major rivers and streams of the valley floor and  
16 around the islands of the Delta, a major bypass system for the Sacramento River and its tributaries,  
17 several bypass segments along the San Joaquin River, and reservoirs on almost all major rivers and  
18 streams draining to the Central Valley (California Department of Water Resources 2012a:1-3). These  
19 facilities were built and owned by different entities ranging from federal, state, and local agencies to  
20 reduce flood risk. That is, the facilities were designed for a capacity or specific purpose that would  
21 mitigate, but not entirely eliminate, flooding. Therefore, there is always flood risk in areas within the  
22 floodplain and protected by these flood management systems, which seek to reduce potential life  
23 loss and property damage. Proper land use management for floodplain and levee-protected areas,  
24 and additional mitigation actions such as flood insurance, are all integral parts of flood management.

25 The study area (i.e., the Delta) is formed by the confluence of the Sacramento and San Joaquin  
26 Rivers. Therefore, the flooding conditions in the Delta can be influenced by the flood management  
27 system and its operation; however, the flooding conditions in the Delta can also be influenced by  
28 eastside tributaries (i.e., the Cosumnes and Mokelumne Rivers), tidal effects, and potential sea level  
29 rise.

30 Flood risk is a combination of the chance of flooding and the consequence of flooding (i.e., life loss  
31 and property damages once flooding occurs), and it is not static through time. Flood risks in the  
32 study area can be influenced by many factors, including the following.

- 33 • Hydrologic conditions, such as the intensity and volume of precipitation and runoff.
- 34 • Existing flood management facilities, such as levees and bypasses.
- 35 • Levee conditions, standards, and level of compliance.
- 36 • Seismic activity.
- 37 • Land subsidence and increased hydraulic loading on a levee and its foundation.
- 38 • Sunny-day hazards, such as damage due to burrowing animals, penetrations, and vegetation.
- 39 • High water conditions, such as high tides and storm surges.
- 40 • Regional planning efforts that address flood management and emergency preparedness,  
41 response, and mitigation.

1 The following sections provide information about the different factors that increase flood risk in the  
2 study area.

### 3 **7.1.3.1 Hydrologic Conditions**

4 California's statewide annual precipitation is highly variable. While annual precipitation ranges  
5 between roughly 100 million and 300 million acre-feet, about 200 million acre-feet of rain and snow  
6 fall per year on average (California Department of Water Resources 2020a:53). This precipitation is  
7 generally greatest in the Sierra Nevada and north coast regions, with precipitation ranging from 36  
8 to 160 inches per year in these areas (California Department of Water Resources 2020a:53).  
9 Conversely, some of the southern regions of the state receive less than 4 inches of precipitation per  
10 year. The geographic variation and the variability in precipitation that California receives make it  
11 challenging to manage the available runoff that can be captured in storage to meet water needs  
12 while also managing flood risk.

13 Annual precipitation data from California shows significant year-to-year variation. This inter-annual  
14 variability makes trend analysis difficult; an analysis of precipitation records since the 1890s shows  
15 no statistically significant trend in precipitation throughout California. Although the overall  
16 precipitation trend is generally flat over the past 120 years, the precipitation record indicates  
17 significant decadal variability giving rise to dry and wet periods. A decadal fluctuation signal has  
18 become apparent in Northern California, where winter precipitation varies with a period of 14 to 15  
19 years (California Department of Water Resources 2020b:10). This decadal signal has increased in  
20 intensity over the twentieth century, resulting in more distinct dry and wet periods. For example,  
21 the average water year (i.e., October 1–September 30) precipitation between 1966 and 2015 was  
22 51.8 inches (California Department of Water Resources 2020b:10). However, there are extremely  
23 dry years—such as 1976–1977 with only 19.0 inches—and extremely wet years—such as 2016–  
24 2017 with 94.7 inches—as a result of this decadal variability.

25 Certain large storm events can lead to high discharge events in upstream areas of the Delta  
26 tributaries (i.e., the Sacramento River, San Joaquin River, and eastside tributaries). This large  
27 increase in Delta inflows—which increases Delta WSEs—can coincide with substantial flooding in  
28 the Delta, as was the case in February 1986. In the 2 weeks prior, heavy rains saturated Northern  
29 California watersheds and contributed to high inflows into the north Delta from the Cosumnes River,  
30 Dry Creek, and the Morrison Stream Group. The inflows exceeded the conveyance capacity of north  
31 Delta channels, resulting in ponding upstream of Franklin Road. A series of levee failures ensued at  
32 Glanville Tract, McCormack-Williamson Tract, Dead Horse Island, Tyler Island, and New Hope Tract  
33 (Delta Conveyance Design and Construction Authority 2022d:Att 1-1).

### 34 **7.1.3.2 Existing Flood Management Facilities**

35 Flood management facilities (e.g., reservoirs, bypasses, levees) along the Sacramento and San  
36 Joaquin Rivers and their tributaries reduce frequency of flooding in the floodplain along these rivers.  
37 Since their construction, these facilities have helped promote public safety and prevent billions of  
38 dollars of flood-related damages (California Department of Water Resources 2017a:iii).

39 Human-made structures and economic activities in a floodplain will be always subject to flood risk.  
40 Flood management facilities were built with specific designed capacities and intended functions and  
41 were not built to stop all flooding. Once infrastructure is in place, an associated level of flood

1 protection may change due to changes in hydrology under climate change and other continued  
2 development in the watershed, especially in the floodplain.

3 Flood management facilities could be overwhelmed and even fail if hydrologic conditions exceed  
4 designed capacities, if certain deficiencies exist, or if a combination of both elements occur. Recent  
5 examples of large-scale flood events include the February 1986 flood with damages that occurred  
6 mostly in the Sacramento Valley and the Delta, and the December 1996–January 1997 flood, during  
7 which there were five deaths and more than \$300 million in damages throughout the Central Valley,  
8 including in the Delta (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2015:1-11).

## 9 **State Plan of Flood Control**

10 The Central Valley’s flood management system consists of many reservoirs, levees, and other flood  
11 management facilities that were built by various entities over time. In 1953, structures, lands,  
12 programs, and modes of operation and maintenance were brought together in a state-federal flood  
13 protection system known as the SPFC. The SPFC facilities include approximately 1,600 miles of  
14 levee, and approximately 150 reservoirs are constructed on streams draining to the Central Valley. A  
15 group of 10 major multipurpose reservoirs play an important role in moderating Central Valley  
16 flood inflows (excluding those draining to the Tulare Lake Basin) (California Department of Water  
17 Resources 2012a:1-5). One such reservoir is Lake Oroville, which regulates the mainstem of the  
18 Feather River as part of the SRFCP and SPFC. Authorized as a multipurpose facility, operation of the  
19 Oroville facilities is dependent on hydrology and DWR’s objectives. Lake Oroville stores winter and  
20 spring runoff for release to the Feather River, as necessary, for SWP and flood control operation  
21 purposes. Typically, releases to the Feather River are managed to conserve water while meeting a  
22 variety of water delivery requirements, including flow, temperature, fisheries, diversions, and water  
23 quality.

24 California’s CVFPB is the regulatory body for flood management in the Central Valley. DWR has flood  
25 management responsibility for its own facilities (e.g., Lake Oroville) and, as described further later,  
26 shares responsibility for operations and maintenance (O&M) for a portion of the flood management  
27 system in the Central Valley with the CVFPB.

28 Wat. Code Section 9110(f) defines the SPFC as follows.

29 The state and federal flood control works, lands, programs, plans, policies, conditions, and mode of  
30 maintenance and operations of the Sacramento River Flood Control Project described in  
31 Section 8350, and of flood control projects in the Sacramento River and San Joaquin River  
32 watersheds authorized pursuant to Article 2 (commencing with Section 12648) of Chapter 2 of Part 6  
33 of Division 6 for which the board or the department has provided the assurances of nonfederal  
34 cooperation to the United States, and those facilities identified in Section 8361.

35 The SPFC facilities are a portion of the larger flood management system in the Central Valley for  
36 which the state has special responsibilities. The SRFCP, as part of the SPFC facilities, is one of the  
37 primary flood control features on the Sacramento River system, as described in the *State Plan of  
38 Flood Control Descriptive Document* (California Department of Water Resources 2010:2-2). The  
39 SRFCP area spans from Red Bluff to the northern Delta and includes a complex system of levees,  
40 overflow weirs, drainage pumping plants, and flood bypass channels. O&M of these facilities serves a  
41 critically important role in managing floods that affect the Delta.

42 The channels of a flood management system convey floodwater for safe discharge based on their  
43 design capacities and profiles. The flood bypass channels (i.e., Butte Basin; Tisdale, Sutter, and Yolo

1 bypasses) of the SRFCP are designed to convey flood flows away from the river systems when their  
2 capacities are constrained due to high runoff conditions. The Yolo Bypass is a feature of the SRFCP  
3 and is located immediately west of the metropolitan area of Sacramento and West Sacramento,  
4 extending from the Fremont Weir (upstream of the Delta) to Liberty Island (within the Delta).  
5 During high water, the diversion of water to the Yolo Bypass relieves the pressure of high flows from  
6 the Sacramento River and alleviates flood risk in the region. This function results in the Yolo Bypass  
7 flooding about once every 33 years, mostly between December and February; it is usually cleared  
8 for farming operation in the spring, but the period of inundation may be longer if necessary (Delta  
9 Stewardship Council 2020:12).

10 CVFPB is the nonfederal sponsor of the SRFCP and shares responsibility with DWR for O&M of these  
11 facilities. DWR is responsible for maintaining and operating some portions of the SRFCP, including  
12 the Fremont Weir, Sacramento Weir, and flood-carrying capacity of the Yolo Bypass. CVFPB also has  
13 agreements with other local maintaining agencies for remaining facilities (California Department of  
14 Water Resources 2010:5-5-5-14, 2017b:5-1). Flood control channels that are part of the SPFC (i.e.,  
15 SPFC channels) are under the jurisdiction of DWR and the CVFPB. As directed by the Central Valley  
16 Flood Protection Act of 2007, DWR prepared the CVFPP as a policy plan to improve flood risk  
17 management, reduce the chance of flooding (and damages once flooding occurs), and improve public  
18 safety, preparedness, and emergency response for the Central Valley receiving protection from the  
19 SPFC. The CVFPP was first adopted by the CVFPB in 2012 and is subject to an update every 5 years.  
20 DWR analyzed channel design capacities and profiles as part the *2017 Flood System Status Report*,  
21 which was incorporated into the *2017 Central Valley Flood Protection Plan Update* (California  
22 Department of Water Resources 2017b, 2017c

23 The SPFC facilities are a portion of the larger flood management system in the Central Valley. The  
24 performance of SPFC facilities relies on non-SPFC federal facilities, including reservoirs—such as  
25 Shasta and Folsom Lakes—that provide substantial regulation of flows to levels that downstream  
26 SPFC facilities can accommodate as designed. On the Sacramento River, Shasta Lake regulates  
27 inflows from the Sacramento, McCloud, and Pit Rivers as well as numerous other tributaries and  
28 creeks. While not part of the SPFC, Shasta Lake—as a multipurpose reservoir—serves an important  
29 role in managing California’s water supply while also providing flood control storage to help manage  
30 flood risk along the Sacramento River (California Department of Water Resources 2010:2-14).  
31 Similarly, Folsom Lake, formed by construction of Folsom Dam and managed by the Bureau of  
32 Reclamation (Reclamation), is the largest reservoir in the American River Basin and the only  
33 reservoir in the basin with designated flood control functions.

34 Other public and private levees, locally operated drainage systems, and other state, federal, and local  
35 facilities work in conjunction with the broader SPFC facilities. Major non-SPFC facilities that affect  
36 the performance of SPFC facilities (or provide flood risk reduction benefits to areas protected by  
37 SPFC levees) include levees that are not part of the federal projects, modifications and alterations to  
38 SPFC levees that have not been state-authorized, debris management facilities (e.g., Yuba  
39 Goldfields), and most of the reservoirs in the Central Valley (California Department of Water  
40 Resources 2017c:1-33).

41 Overall, the riverine system and channels in the Central Valley have been heavily modified and have  
42 limited capacity due to early reclamation development in the twentieth century (California  
43 Department of Water Resources 2010:5-2).

## 1 **Flood Management Facilities in the Delta**

2 Land uses in the Delta are primarily rural and are dominated by agriculture and open space, with  
3 several dispersed small communities, although larger population centers (i.e., Sacramento, West  
4 Sacramento, and Stockton) exist as well. Flood management facilities within the Delta primarily  
5 include levees, which often protect lands at or below sea level. Flood management in the Delta is  
6 mainly provided via reclamation districts and local flood control agencies. Flood management  
7 responsibilities in Delta areas outside areas protected by SPFC facilities are managed by a variety of  
8 local agencies, which are supported by the state’s Delta Special Flood Projects Program and Delta  
9 Levees Maintenance Subventions Program (California Department of Water Resources 2012a:3-24).  
10 In addition to flood protection, Delta levees also benefit habitats and ecosystems and offer  
11 significant recreational opportunities (Delta Stewardship Council 2020:21).

12 About 380 miles of the total 1,100 miles of levees in the Delta are SPFC levees (Delta Stewardship  
13 Council 2017:1). SPFC levees are subject to federal levee standards and, where applicable, to DWR’s  
14 *Urban Levee Design Criteria*, which requires a 200-year level of flood protection (California  
15 Department of Water Resources 2012b:7-1 to 7-50); they are also under CVFPB jurisdiction. SPFC  
16 levees in the northern Delta are part of the SRFCP and partially protect urban centers (i.e., 200-year  
17 level of flood protection)—such as Sacramento and West Sacramento—and smaller, unincorporated  
18 Delta towns (i.e., 100-year level of flood protection)—such as Clarksburg, Hood, and Courtland  
19 (California Department of Water Resources 2017b:3-3). Figure 7-2 distinguishes between the urban  
20 and nonurban levees in the northern Delta; this figure was adapted from Figure G01 in the  
21 Sacramento River Flood Flow Hydraulic Modeling—HEC-RAS 2D Technical Memorandum in  
22 Attachment A of the *Delta Conveyance Final Draft Engineering Project Report* (EPR) (Delta  
23 Conveyance Design and Construction Authority 2022e:21). In the southern Delta, the Lower San  
24 Joaquin River Flood Control Project is also part of SPFC facilities and includes levees that protect, or  
25 partially protect, urban or urbanizing communities such as Stockton, Lathrop, and Manteca (U.S.  
26 Army Corps of Engineers 1999; California Department of Water Resources 2010:2-3). The SRFCP  
27 and Lower San Joaquin River Flood Control Project also protect islands within the Delta, such as  
28 Sherman Island, Jones Tract, Upper Roberts Island, Middle Roberts Island, and Lower Roberts  
29 Island.

30 Most of the levees in the Delta (i.e., 720 of 1,110 miles of levees) are local non-project levees (Delta  
31 Stewardship Council 2017:7-1). Wat. Code Section 12980(e) defines these local levees in the Delta as  
32 “nonproject levee[s]” in contrast to “project levee[s]”—which are defined in Wat. Code  
33 Section 12980(f) and referred to as SPFC levees in the Delta. For consistency and clarity in this  
34 chapter, non-project levees are referred to as non-SPFC levees.

35 These non-SPFC levees were built by landowners or local reclamation districts to reclaim the lands  
36 for agricultural and economic development purposes. Non-SPFC levees also protect portions of the  
37 deep-water ship channels to the two major inland ports. The Stockton Deep Water Ship Channel was  
38 built in 1933 for navigation purposes and follows the San Joaquin River past Rough and Ready  
39 Island to the Port of Stockton via Stockton Channel (County of Contra Costa 2012:10-8). The  
40 Sacramento River Deep Water Ship Channel follows the Sacramento River and Cache Slough prior to  
41 entering the excavated deep-water channel that extends to the Port of Sacramento in West  
42 Sacramento. The levees on the east sides of the Sacramento River, Cache Slough, and the Sacramento  
43 River Deep Water Ship Channel are SPFC levees. The levees on the west side of the Sacramento River  
44 upstream of Rio Vista, west side of Cache Slough, and a portion of the west side of the excavated  
45 channel near Cache Slough are non-SPFC levees.




1 Levee inspection and maintenance for non-SPFC levees in the Delta is the responsibility of  
2 landowners or local reclamation districts. The SPFC levees in the Delta are inspected by DWR and  
3 designated local maintenance agencies according to their corresponding O&M agreements, and the  
4 findings are documented in the *Flood Control System Status Report*, which is updated every 5 years  
5 (California Department of Water Resources 2017c:2-5).

6 Until recently, communities protected were eligible for FEMA disaster assistance in a flooding event  
7 if their non-SPFC levees met the design guidelines in the 1983 *Flood Hazard Mitigation Plan for the*  
8 *Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta* (Delta HMP) developed by DWR for the Office of Emergency Services  
9 (CalOES) and approved by in negotiations between DWR and FEMA (California Wat. Code § 12984;  
10 Delta Stewardship Council 2017:ES-6). This was considered a short-term mitigation. In 2014, FEMA  
11 did not renew the Delta HMP and thus, the assistance eligibility would be for communities with  
12 levees meeting the Delta-specific PL 84-99 standards or Bulletin 192-82. Costs for improvement and  
13 frequent maintenance of non-SPFC levees can be beyond the financial capacity of property owners  
14 and local reclamation districts. The estimated state-subsidized expenditures to maintain non-SPFC  
15 Delta levees, including local matching funds, averages about \$11.6 million annually (Delta  
16 Stewardship Council 2020:25). The next subsection provides additional information on applicable  
17 levee standards.

### 18 **7.1.3.3 Levee Standards and Compliance**

19 Levees are an important element of flood protection; however, levees are not constructed to  
20 withstand all hydrologic conditions. Levees are designed to accommodate specific design channel  
21 capacities or WSE profiles. Therefore, levee performance could have a strong correlation to channel  
22 performance (i.e., channel capacity). Over the last few decades, state and federal agencies have  
23 developed guidelines, standards, and permitting requirements for levees. These standards and  
24 guidelines generally establish minimum criteria for levee design and maintenance. Levee geometry  
25 standards and requirements in the Delta vary based on SPFC versus non-SPFC levees and for urban  
26 versus nonurban levees. Urban levees are those that protect an urban area, which means a  
27 developed area in which there are 10,000 residents or more (Government Code § 65007(j)). Figure  
28 7-2 shows the distribution of urban and nonurban levees in the north Delta.

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A text description of this figure is provided in Chapter 39, Text Descriptions of Figures

1  
2

**Figure 7-2 Map of the Urban and Nonurban Levees Along the Sacramento River Between the American River Confluence and Sutter Slough**

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1 There are different design standards applicable to a Delta levee depending on the combination of its  
2 status as a SPFC facility and the area it provides protection. The relevant design standards are  
3 generally summarized below (Delta Stewardship Council 2020:16-19).

- 4 • DWR Urban Levee Design Criteria: This standard goes beyond criteria for levee height and  
5 geometric design to include requirements for freeboard, slope stability, seepage/underseepage,  
6 erosion, settlement, and seismic stability (California Department of Water Resources 2012b:7-1  
7 to 7-50). It is intended to protect against an 0.5% AEP flood (i.e., a 200-year level of flood  
8 protection) and is the only levee standard that specifically links land uses to levee criteria. State  
9 law requires that by 2025, land use agencies cannot enter into a development agreement for a  
10 property within a flood hazard zone unless the city or county finds, based on substantial evidence  
11 in the record, that the facilities of the SPFC or other flood management facilities protect the  
12 property to the urban level of flood protection in urban and urbanizing areas or the FEMA  
13 standard of flood protection in nonurbanized areas or other conditions allowed in Government  
14 Code Section 65865.5.
- 15 • FEMA 100-year Protection: This “insurance” standard, often called the “1% annual chance flood”  
16 level of protection, provides criteria that levees must meet to protect against the flooding that is  
17 the basis for FEMA’s FIRMs (44 Code of Federal Regulations § 65.10). It is often used with  
18 established USACE criteria to prescribe requirements for levee freeboard, slope stability,  
19 seepage/underseepage, erosion, and settlement. The standard generally does not address seismic  
20 stability. In communities where levees provide this level of flood protection, new developments  
21 are not required to meet federal floodproofing standards and can obtain federally guaranteed  
22 mortgages without purchasing flood insurance.
- 23 • Bulletin 192-82: Bulletin 192 was first completed by DWR in 1975 and adopted by the  
24 Legislature in 1976 as a conceptual plan to guide the formulation of projects to preserve the  
25 integrity of the Delta levee system (Wat. Code § 12225). Bulletin 192-82, its update, refined the  
26 plan and provided recommendations to the Legislature for implementation. The plan was  
27 intended to eventually have all levees within the Delta—regardless of protecting urban or  
28 agricultural areas—upgraded to a minimum configuration, thus reducing the chances for failure.  
29 However, it recognized that on a few islands, levee improvements would be uneconomical, a  
30 conclusion with which the Legislature concurred (Wat. Code § 128981(b)). Bulletin 192-82 was  
31 thus formalized to provide guidance for the Delta Levees Maintenance Subventions Program  
32 (Wat. Code § 12987) and the referenced levee standard to receive the state’s financial assistance.  
33 The design standard requires a freeboard of 3.0 feet and 1.5 feet above the expected 300-year  
34 flood stage for levees protecting urban and agricultural areas, respectively. The standard also  
35 includes a requirement of 16-foot minimum crown width with a waterside slope of 1 vertical on 2  
36 horizontal, and a landside slope of 1 vertical on 3 horizontal (California Department of Water  
37 Resources 1982:54–57). For the purposes of Delta levee maintenance, an urban area means an  
38 area in which 10% or more of the land area within the improvement project is used for  
39 residential use (Wat. Code § 12986(d)(2)). The recurrence interval of 300 years was based on the  
40 benefit-cost analysis by USACE on extreme Delta inflow and water stages as affected by high tide  
41 and wind. In areas with tidal dominated waters, the difference between a 50-year flood and a  
42 300-year flood was about 0.5 foot (California Department of Water Resources 1982:54–57).
- 43 • PL 84-99: This is USACE’s program that establishes guidelines for levee design geometry,  
44 construction, operations, and maintenance. This guidance for levee geometry implies a minimum  
45 levee height and a slope stability factor of safety but is not associated with a level of protection  
46 (such as a 100-year flood) and does not address seismic stability. The minimum geometry criteria

1 were not intended to become a “design standard” for non-SPFC levees, but rather a uniform  
2 procedure to establish eligibility for federal rehabilitation assistance for nonfederal flood control  
3 projects. Local maintaining agencies must apply to participate in the program and must regularly  
4 demonstrate that their levees and levee operations meet or exceed the program’s requirements  
5 in order to be eligible for federally funded emergency assistance, including flood fighting support  
6 and rehabilitation of levees damaged by flooding. USACE’s periodic inspection program  
7 incorporates other elements into eligibility, including presence of structure encroachments,  
8 vegetation, and rodent control programs.

9 PL 84-99 Delta-Specific Standards were developed for non-SPFC levees to qualify for rehabilitation  
10 under PL 84-99 and are intended to supplement the national guidelines. They were developed based  
11 on the Delta’s particular organic soils and levee foundations conditions and require a freeboard of  
12 1.5 feet above the 100-year flood stage for all islands/tracts, a minimum 16-foot crown width with a  
13 waterside slope of 1 vertical on 2 horizontal, and a landside slope of 1 vertical on 3 to 5 horizontal  
14 (depending on the levee height and depth of peat soil). These standards are not intended to  
15 establish design standards for the non-SPFC levees in the Delta, but to provide uniform procedures  
16 to be used by USACE in determining eligibility under PL 84-99. The Delta-specific PL 84-99 standard  
17 uses a 100-year hydraulic profile that is used to establish a geometric cross section similar to  
18 Bulletin 192-82 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1988:9-10).

19 As previously mentioned, until 2014, non-SPFC levee upgrades often sought improvement to meet  
20 design guidelines established by the Delta HMP as a step towards the Delta-specific PL 84-99 or  
21 Bulletin 192-82 standards. The 2000 CALFED Bay-Delta Program Record of Decision set a goal of  
22 improving Delta levees to meet the PL 84-99 criteria, as does the Delta Protection Commission’s  
23 Economic Sustainability Plan, but funding has been inadequate to attain this objective. Five Delta  
24 reclamation districts, protecting about 3% of the legal Delta’s land behind about 41 miles of levees,  
25 meet or exceed the Delta-specific PL 84-99 criteria, and 24 more districts are more than halfway to  
26 improving levees to this standard (Delta Stewardship Council 2020:17).

27 In 2014, this agreement between FEMA and CalOES on using standards of the Delta HMP was not  
28 renewed, despite the considerable state investment in its implementation. The agreement’s  
29 termination partly reflected FEMA’s concern that sufficient progress had not been made toward its  
30 long-term goal of bringing levees up to the USACE Delta-specific PL 84-99 standard and the growing  
31 realization of the costs that flood disasters nationwide are imposing on the federal government. As a  
32 result, current non-SPFC levee improvements generally aim to meet Delta-specific PL 84-99 or  
33 Bulletin 192-82 standards.

### 34 **7.1.3.4 Seismic Activity**

35 The Delta’s levees are threatened by the active seismic zones west of the Delta, including the San  
36 Andreas and Hayward faults. Less active faults, such as the Southern Midland Fault, underlie the  
37 Delta. A strong earthquake could damage Delta levees because of the potential for deformation or  
38 cracking of levees or the liquefaction of levee embankments and foundations during strong ground  
39 shaking. Moderate earthquakes between 1979 and 1984 damaged nearby Delta levees, and many  
40 Delta islands’ levees failed during floods within a year after the 1906 San Francisco earthquake  
41 (Delta Stewardship Council 2020:7). If a levee failed on an island subsided below sea level or during  
42 high flows or if a flood were to occur soon after an earthquake, the protected area could be  
43 inundated.

1 The DWR Delta Risk Management Strategy Phase 1 study evaluated the performance of Delta levees  
2 under various seismic threat scenarios and analyzed potential consequences for water supply, water  
3 quality, ecosystem values, and public health and safety. The study concluded that a major  
4 earthquake of magnitude 6.7 or greater in the vicinity of the Delta Region has a 62% probability of  
5 occurring sometime between 2003 and 2032 (California Department of Water Resources 2009:2).  
6 More recent investigations suggest earthquake-induced ground shaking affecting Delta levees may  
7 be less serious but still worrisome (Delta Stewardship Council 2020:7). Although the probabilistic  
8 nature of earthquake prediction makes it difficult to quantify the timing and magnitude of seismic  
9 threats, it is important to address the threats posed by earthquakes to the Delta levee system  
10 because of the potential adverse effects of such events.

### 11 **7.1.3.5 Land Subsidence**

12 Delta island subsidence resulting from the biochemical oxidation of organic soils and wind  
13 disturbance could pose a significant threat to Delta levees. The areas that are most susceptible to  
14 subsidence are the central, western, and northern Delta, where thick organic peat layers  
15 predominate (Public Policy Institute of California 2008:9). As the landside ground elevation  
16 decreases because of subsidence, the resulting increase in elevation difference between the water  
17 surface and ground provides increased hydraulic loading on the levee and its foundation and  
18 associated risks related to seepage, piping, and slope instability. Recently, projects have been  
19 implemented in the western Delta for subsidence reversal, carbon sequestration, or both (California  
20 Department of Water Resources 2022b).

### 21 **7.1.3.6 Sunny-Day Hazards**

22 Even without an earthquake or flood, sunny-day levee failures do occasionally occur in the Delta.  
23 Generally, these failures may be the result of a combination of preexisting internal levee and  
24 foundation weaknesses caused by internal erosion of the levee and foundation over time and human  
25 interventions such as dredging or excavation at the toe of the levee (Delta Stewardship Council  
26 2020:8). Internal erosion is often a result of seepage through the levee, which creates water  
27 pressure within the levee structure and is characterized through the formation of sand boils.  
28 Structural instability may also occur when seepage forces cause sloughing of the levee landside  
29 slope, shortening seepage paths that increase the probability of levee failure.

30 Other hazards that affect the performance of Delta levees include burrowing animals,  
31 encroachments, and penetrations. Burrowing animals, especially species such as beavers, ground  
32 squirrels, and owls, can weaken the structural integrity of a levee and increase the likelihood of  
33 piping. Encroachments, such as structures or farming practices on or close to the levee, can  
34 adversely affect a levee if they are not constructed or maintained in accordance with the  
35 requirements of federal, state, and local agencies. Penetrations of the levee, such as culverts or  
36 pipelines, can weaken the structural integrity of levees and lead to levee instability if the waterside  
37 opening does not have an appropriate closure device that seals the opening and prevents excessive  
38 seepage. Because of unregulated historical construction, levees also contain many hidden hazards.  
39 Interaction among the factors listed above is also common and increases the probability of levee  
40 failure.

### 1 **7.1.3.7 High Water Conditions**

2 The same hazards present during sunny-day conditions are exacerbated during high water events  
3 (e.g., winter atmospheric river storms), which are expected to increase in number and frequency  
4 under climate change conditions (Delta Stewardship Council 2021:3-17). Moreover, water levels in  
5 the Delta are influenced by the tide level at the Golden Gate Bridge. When these storms coincide with  
6 extreme winter tides (i.e., king tides), storm surges and high wind waves can cause levee failure  
7 (Maendly 2018:12–13, 46). Increased seepage is also common during these events. As sea levels rise  
8 in the future, tides and water levels will increase hydraulic stress on the levees and increase flood  
9 risk in the Delta.

### 10 **7.1.3.8 Potential Climate Change Effects**

11 Climate change has major implications for the Delta, and especially for flood risk management. The  
12 California Ocean Protection Council's (OPC) most conservative, risk-averse climate change scenario  
13 (H++) estimates 10.2 feet of sea level rise at the San Francisco tide gage by the year 2100. By 2050,  
14 rising sea levels will more than double the probability of flooding if levees are not only well-  
15 maintained, but also improved (Delta Stewardship Council 2020:10). Drainage of Delta islands will  
16 also be more difficult, impairing agriculture on which the finances of many reclamation districts  
17 rely. This projected sea level rise could be expected to be exacerbated during high water events,  
18 which are discussed in Section 7.1.3.7, *High Water Conditions*.

### 19 **7.1.3.9 Regional Planning Efforts Related to Delta Flood Management**

20 Many planning efforts addressing flood management and emergency preparedness, response, and  
21 mitigation are under way, including the following.

- 22 • *Central Valley Flood Protection Plan (CVFPP)*. The Central Valley Flood Protection Act of 2008  
23 directed DWR to develop, and CVFPP to adopt, the CVFPP—which was first published in 2012  
24 and updated in 2017 and 2022 (California Department of Water Resources 2012a, 2017b,  
25 2022a). The CVFPP, developed under DWR's FloodSAFE California, established a systemwide  
26 approach to improving flood management in areas currently receiving protection from SPFC  
27 facilities (California Department of Water Resources 2012a:3-21). Following adoption of the  
28 2012 CVFPP, DWR funded six regionally led Regional Flood Management Plans (RFMPs) that  
29 describe local and regional flood management priorities and challenges. These RFMPs also  
30 identified potential funding mechanisms and site-specific improvement needs. In the 2017 CVFPP  
31 (California Department of Water Resources 2017b), DWR refined analyses and updated flood risk  
32 estimates for the Central Valley. Without continued implementation of the recommended plan,  
33 the estimated expected annual damage for 2017 (the existing condition for the 2017 CVFPP  
34 update) is about \$329 million per year in the Central Valley, with a potential 66 lives lost per year  
35 in the Sacramento River Basin and a potential 149 lives lost in the San Joaquin River Basin  
36 (California Department of Water Resources 2017b:3-35). As clarified by DWR, expected annual  
37 life loss is not a predictor of life loss for a given year but rather an indicator of potential life loss  
38 for any given year considering the full range of potential flood events and the likelihood of those  
39 occurring. CVFPP results are informative indices of life risk but do not forecast deaths expected  
40 to occur from flood events. Neither are these indicators to be used for emergency planning or  
41 other purposes. Potential life loss would require more detailed analyses and supporting data than  
42 that used in the CVFPP or its update (California Department of Water Resources 2012a:2-21,  
43 2017b:3-35, 2017c:3-2). DWR recently released the public draft 2022 CVFPP Update in April



1 2022 to document the continued implementation of the State Systemwide Investment Approach  
2 with a focus on climate resilience, performance tracking, and integration and alignment with  
3 other state water management plans.

- 4 ● Delta Stewardship Council's *Delta Plan*. To reduce flood risk to people, property, and state  
5 interests in the Delta, the Delta Reform Act requires that the Delta Stewardship Council's *Delta*  
6 *Plan* promote effective emergency response and preparedness, appropriate land use, and  
7 strategic investments in levees (Wat. Code § 85305). The Delta Reform Act also directs the Delta  
8 Stewardship Council, in consultation with CVFPB, to recommend priorities for state investments  
9 in levee operation, maintenance, and improvements in the Delta, including both SPFC and non-  
10 SPFC levees (Wat. Code § 85306). In spring 2014, the Delta Stewardship Council began  
11 developing the Delta Levees Investment Strategy, which combines risk analysis, economics,  
12 engineering, and decision-making techniques to identify funding priorities and assembled a  
13 comprehensive investment strategy for the Delta levees. In March 2020, the Delta Stewardship  
14 Council amended Chapter 7 of the *Delta Plan*, which provides an overview of flood risk in the  
15 Delta, current flood management efforts, and the most pertinent agencies and regulations.
- 16 ● Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Multi-Hazard Coordination Task Force Report. This report  
17 responds to Wat. Code Section 12994.5, which called for the task force to make recommendations  
18 to the Governor about Delta multi-hazard emergency response and recovery issues. The task  
19 force was directed to make recommendations to CalOES about creating an interagency unified  
20 command system organizational framework in accordance with the guidelines of the National  
21 Incident Management System and the Standardized Emergency Management System; coordinate  
22 development of a draft emergency preparedness and response strategy for the Delta; and  
23 develop and conduct all-hazard emergency response exercises and training in the Delta that  
24 would test or facilitate implementation of regional coordination protocols (Delta Stewardship  
25 Council 2020:39). In 2018, CalOES released the *Northern California Catastrophic Flood Response*  
26 *Plan*, which provides a framework outlining how local, state, and federal governments would  
27 respond and coordinate in anticipation of and following a catastrophic flood event, with  
28 emphasis on impacts on the Delta (California Governor's Office of Emergency Services 2018).
- 29 ● CVP and SWP Reoperation Studies. DWR's Forecast-Coordinated Operations Program and  
30 Systems Reoperation Program address reservoir operational criteria.

31 State expenditures on Delta levees have greatly reduced the frequency of levee failures (Delta  
32 Stewardship Council 2017:ES-7). State funding programs for levee improvements on Delta islands  
33 and tracts vary based on location and type of levee. Since the 1980s, state funds for Delta levees are  
34 available through the Delta Levees Maintenance Subventions Program or the Delta Levees Special  
35 Flood Control Projects Program. These grant monies helped fund levee maintenance and  
36 improvements in many areas of the Delta.

37 During floods, DWR emergency response activities and local maintenance agencies could prevent  
38 and have prevented many potential levee failures (California Department of Water Resources  
39 2012a:4-2 to 4-3). Therefore, the realized levee failures were often less than predicted in typical  
40 flood risk assessments.

41 DWR, CVFPB and USACE each play unique and critical roles in Delta flood risk management.  
42 Frequent, ongoing collaboration with other state, federal, and local agencies to improve  
43 communication and coordination is essential to meeting the Delta's flood management objectives.

## 7.2 Applicable Laws, Regulations, and Programs

The applicable laws, regulations, and programs considered in the assessment of project impacts on flood protection are indicated in Section 7.3.1, *Methods for Analysis*, or the impact analysis, as appropriate. Applicable laws, regulations, and programs associated with state and federal agencies that have a review or potential approval responsibility have also been considered in the development of CEQA impact thresholds or are otherwise considered in the assessment of environmental impacts. A listing of some of the agencies and their respective potential review and approval responsibilities, in addition to those under CEQA, is provided in Chapter 1, *Introduction*, Table 1-1. A listing of some of the federal agencies and their respective potential review, approval, and other responsibilities, in addition to those under NEPA, is provided in Chapter 1, Table 1-2.

## 7.3 Environmental Impacts

This section describes the direct and cumulative environmental impacts on flood protection that would result from project construction, operation, and maintenance. This section also describes the methods used to determine the impacts of the project, and lists the thresholds used to conclude whether an impact would be significant. Measures to mitigate (i.e., avoid, minimize, rectify, reduce, eliminate, or compensate for) potentially significant impacts are also provided.

### 7.3.1 Methods for Analysis

This section describes the qualitative and quantitative methods used to evaluate flood protection-related impacts of the project alternatives within the study area. These impacts would be associated with construction, operation, and maintenance of the project, and implementation of compensatory mitigation.

#### 7.3.1.1 Process and Methods of Review for Flood Protection

As described in Chapter 3, *Description of the Proposed Project and Alternatives*, the project alternatives do not include any changes in flood control operations. Flood control operation and associated rules are under the jurisdiction of USACE. Therefore, the operations of project alternatives would have no impacts on flood protection upstream of the Delta, and the level of flood protection under project alternatives would remain the same. Since the project would not affect the Sacramento River upstream of the Delta or the San Joaquin River Basin outside of the Delta, the study area associated with flood protection focuses on the specific areas in the Delta that may be affected by project facilities—including the intakes, launch/maintenance/reception shafts, and Southern Forebay (although the Southern Forebay is applicable to Alternatives 1, 2a, 2b, 2c, 3, 4a, 4b, and 4c only).

Consistent with the evaluation of potential impacts on other resources, the qualitative and quantitative analyses discussed in this section assess the significance of project impacts in relation to existing conditions. Effects on flood protection were assessed by identifying flood risks within the study area to evaluate whether flood protection would be affected temporarily by construction or permanently by operations of permanent facilities of the project.

Many major components of project construction and facilities are underground. The assessment for potential flood protection impacts from construction and operations of permanent facilities were for

1 aboveground facilities only. Specifically, the assessment for flood protection impacts associated with  
2 the project alternatives examined: (1) changes that may increase flooding or flood risk in the Delta,  
3 and (2) changes to the potential rate or amount of runoff that may impede or redirect localized flood  
4 flows. However, these two areas of review require different settings to accommodate the different  
5 regulatory frameworks associated with applicable flood management practices. The following  
6 subsections summarize these two areas of impact assessments, including the reasons for selecting  
7 the associated existing conditions and No Project Alternative and the resulting impacts on flood  
8 management.

### 9 **Process and Method of Review for Potential Increase in Delta Flood Risks**

10 There are many contributing factors to Delta risks of flooding, and they would continue to play a  
11 role in Delta flood risks. All project alternatives are for water supply purposes and include no  
12 changes in flood management infrastructure in the Sacramento River Basin and in the Delta,  
13 including the reservoirs of the SRFCP and CVP, and associated flood operation rules and  
14 management. Therefore, changes from project alternatives that may increase flooding or flood risk  
15 in the Delta are related to the construction and operation of the intakes on the Sacramento River,  
16 which is often the primary source of flood flow from upstream watersheds.

17 The intakes located along the Sacramento River where SPFC levees are present may affect the  
18 drainage of the Sacramento River flow during flooding conditions. Therefore, the preference and  
19 consistency with regulatory requirements for SPFC levees and CVFPP's jurisdiction would be  
20 followed, including the consistency with the CVFPP. The CVFPP, prepared by DWR in accordance  
21 with the Central Valley Flood Protection Act of 2008 and adopted by the CVFPP, is California's  
22 strategic blueprint to improve flood risk management in the Central Valley, and guides the state's  
23 participation in managing flood risk in areas protected by the SPFC. The CVFPP is updated every 5  
24 years and thus, for this Draft EIR, tools and methods consistent with those for the 2022 CVFPP  
25 Update were used for evaluating the potential impacts on the SPFC facilities and their resulting flood  
26 protection.

27 The 2022 CVFPP Update has a 50-year planning horizon that begins in 2022 for analysis purposes  
28 and for developing assessment strategy (California Department of Water Resources 2022a). For  
29 consistency with the governing regulatory framework, the analysis for potential flood control  
30 impacts on the area protected by the SPFC should be conducted using a similar planning horizon. In  
31 other words, the portion of the impact analyses that evaluate areas protected by the SPFC uses the  
32 years 2022 and 2072 as reference years for existing conditions and the No Project Alternative,  
33 respectively. Additional detail on the data and analytical tools used to assess the impacts of the  
34 project on flood control is provided within the impact assessments below.

35 In addition to the increase in WSEs, effects on the localized velocity pattern changes near the intakes  
36 and the resulting erosion and scouring could also affect the SPFC levee stability. The final design of  
37 project alternatives would include detailed evaluation and measures to minimize these effects.

### 38 **Process and Method of Review for Impeding or Redirecting Localized Flood Flow**

39 Many other facilities of the project alternatives are in the flood hazard zone and thus, it is necessary  
40 to evaluate the potential impacts from these facilities on impeding or redirecting localized flood  
41 flow.

1 The project alternatives include design criteria to protect the facilities during flooding. As described  
2 in Chapter 3 and detailed in the EPRs (Delta Conveyance Design and Construction Authority  
3 2022a:16, 18, 39, 47, 54, 66; 2022b:29, 42, 45-46), permanent project facilities would be designed  
4 for long-term operations, and to be protected from a 200-year flood event (i.e., 0.5% AEP) with  
5 climate-change-induced hydrology, sea level rise for 2100 conditions, freeboard criteria, and wind  
6 fetch wave run-up. These design criteria are not related to impacts on adjacent areas; however, the  
7 incorporated protection would prevent potential inundation of water conveyance structure and  
8 avoid redirected impacts.

9 The overall approach to flood management associated with facility construction and permanent  
10 operations includes a combination of nonstructural and structural flood risk management measures  
11 to reduce the risk of flooding during construction and operations, including at tunnel shafts. In this  
12 context, nonstructural measures could involve staging of temporary facilities or equipment, but such  
13 facilities or equipment would not significantly affect the construction footprint or on-site activities.  
14 Nonstructural measures would involve fully integrating the project construction team with existing  
15 Delta flood preparation, response, and recovery systems using methods that range from safety  
16 training to safety kits for sheltering in place, especially in the case of a levee failure (Delta  
17 Conveyance Design and Construction Authority 2022d:8-10). This would occur in coordination with  
18 reclamation districts, levee maintaining agencies, and state and federal agencies with direct  
19 responsibilities, authorities, or emergency support roles over Delta levees, including USACE, FEMA,  
20 Reclamation, CalOES, DWR, and CVFPB. During construction, measures to minimize effects on  
21 existing levees would be implemented, including avoiding or minimizing the use of existing levees as  
22 construction haul routes for the project and setbacks of project activities from existing levees that  
23 are to be determined during the design phase based on site-specific investigation and analyses.

24 Most construction sites contain local irrigation and drainage facilities installed by existing or  
25 previous private landowners or reclamation districts. These systems may serve parcels that would  
26 be acquired for the project and adjacent parcels. Many of these existing facilities are buried and  
27 therefore not visible on aerial photographs. Consequently, for project feature locations without site  
28 access, no further analyses can be conducted at this time. During the design phase, when the project  
29 can acquire access to specific parcels, irrigation and drainage facilities would be mapped for each  
30 site. If the facilities used by adjacent properties to move water from the existing diversion are  
31 located on a parcel to be used for a project feature, pipelines or canals would be installed to  
32 maintain service to the adjacent properties.

33 The intakes and associated facilities would be located in the 100-year floodplain within DWR  
34 Maintenance Area 9, Reclamation District 744, and Reclamation District 813. The temporary and  
35 permanent infrastructure would affect the flow pattern and drainage of local floodwater, which  
36 would drain to Stone Lakes Canal during flooding conditions. The project alternatives would  
37 redesign the local drainage canals that are affected and would potentially upgrade the existing  
38 pumps to maintain adequate drainage in the areas protected by levees. Therefore, no further  
39 analyses are required for impact assessment.

40 Structural measures for flood management and facility protection may rely on existing levees that  
41 would be improved to meet PL 84-99 standards unless the surrounding levees already meet PL 84-  
42 99 standards. Given the long duration of work at the Bouldin (central alignment) and Lower Roberts  
43 Island (eastern and Bethany Reservoir alignments) tunnel launch sites, improvements of the island  
44 perimeter levee to meet PL 84-99 geometric standards, as well as addressing any known  
45 geotechnical weaknesses, are warranted to limit long-term flood risk. The extent and types of

1 recommended levee repairs would be refined prior to construction and in coordination with the  
2 local reclamation districts. This approach would present an improvement to existing conditions.  
3 Therefore, no additional evaluation is required. The Twin Cities Complex is one exception to this  
4 approach. A ring levee configured in compliance with PL 84-99 standards would be used for the  
5 Twin Cities Complex since it is not fully protected by perimeter levees. Therefore, a site-specific  
6 evaluation of potential impacts from the proposed facilities on flood flows in the 100-year floodplain  
7 is required using a methodology consistent with that for FEMA FIRMs.

8 The Southern Forebay facilities would be designed in accordance with the DSOD requirements for  
9 jurisdictional dams based on the anticipated maximum height and storage volume. The levees on  
10 Byron Tract around the Southern Forebay are maintained by Reclamation District 800 and have met  
11 PL 84-99 standards. Therefore, there will be no need for improvements to the surrounding levees or  
12 a ring levee. However, as part of the design requirements for DSOD jurisdiction dams, an overflow  
13 emergency spillway would be used in the unlikely condition that the forebay water level continued  
14 to rise above the design maximum elevation. The emergency spillway would discharge flow from the  
15 Southern Forebay into Italian Slough, which flows into Old River. The evaluation of impacts on flood  
16 protection focuses on the flow path of the emergency release per DSOD requirements and potential  
17 effects on adjacent levees and associated protected areas.

18 Consistent with the evaluation of potential impacts on other resources, the qualitative and  
19 quantitative analyses discussed in this section assess the significance of project impacts in relation  
20 to existing conditions. Existing conditions include existing facilities and ongoing programs that  
21 existed as of January 15, 2020 (i.e., the publication date of the Notice of Preparation). The No Project  
22 Alternative includes reasonably foreseeable changes in existing conditions (e.g., sea level rise,  
23 climate change) and changes that could be expected to occur in the year 2040 if the project were not  
24 approved.

25 Unique to this chapter, existing conditions and the No Project Alternative require an additional  
26 planning horizon that is different from the conditions (i.e., 2020 and 2040) previously discussed.  
27 This is done to better align with applicable flood management frameworks, in particular, the 2022  
28 CVFPP Update, which is the long-term plan for the area protected by the SPFC (California  
29 Department of Water Resources 2022a). The 2022 CVFPP Update has a 50-year planning horizon  
30 that begins in 2022 for analysis purposes and for developing assessment strategy. Therefore, the  
31 analysis for potential flood control impacts on the area protected by the SPFC should be conducted  
32 using a similar planning horizon. To maintain consistency with the planning horizon used in the  
33 2022 CVFPP Update, impact analyses that evaluate areas protected by the SPFC use the years 2022  
34 and 2072 as reference years for existing conditions and the No Project Alternative, respectively.

35 For potential flood protection impacts on areas that do not receive protection from the SPFC (i.e.,  
36 Impact FP-2), the year 2020 was used for existing conditions and the project alternatives while the  
37 year 2040 was used for the No Project Alternative—consistent with the evaluation of other resource  
38 areas in this Draft EIR. For potential flood protection impacts on areas that do receive protection  
39 from the SPFC (i.e., Impact FP-1), the year 2022 was used for existing conditions and the project  
40 alternatives while the year 2072 was used for the No Project Alternative—consistent with available  
41 flood tools and other planning efforts associated with the 2022 CVFPP Update (California  
42 Department of Water Resources 2022a). Project alternatives for each impact analysis were  
43 evaluated under the same reference year used for their respective existing conditions. That is,  
44 project alternatives for Impact FP-1 were evaluated under 2022 conditions while project  
45 alternatives for Impact FP-2 were evaluated under 2020 conditions. Table 7-1 includes a

1 comparison of the reference years used for the existing and future conditions associated with each  
2 impact analysis in this chapter.

3 A more detailed description of the existing conditions, No Project Alternative, and the assumptions  
4 associated with each are included in Appendix 3C, *Defining Existing Conditions, No Project*  
5 *Alternative, and Cumulative Impact Conditions*. More details on the data and analytical tools are  
6 provided in later impact assessments under operations and construction.

7 Where appropriate, different permitting requirements for construction and operations of project  
8 alternatives were utilized to ensure compliance with flood protection regulations, which in some  
9 cases required customized analyses.

### 10 **7.3.1.2 Assessing Potential Flood Protection Impacts from Construction**

11 Construction of the project alternatives could affect: (1) WSEs of the Sacramento River between the  
12 confluence of the American River and Sutter Slough (near the proposed north Delta intakes), and (2)  
13 the depth and areal extent of the 100-year flood event at the Twin Cities Complex site.

14 The Southern Forebay is located on Byron Tract, an area that is already protected by levees that  
15 substantially meet the PL 84-99 criteria (Figure 7-1). Therefore, no further analysis on construction  
16 impacts on flood protection at Byron Tract was conducted

#### 17 **North Delta Intakes on Sacramento River (Impact FP-1)**

18 To evaluate the potential impacts from construction of the proposed north Delta intakes on the  
19 drainage of Sacramento River flows during flood conditions, a Sacramento River hydraulic river  
20 model was prepared and used to evaluate river reaches in the Sacramento River between the  
21 American River confluence and Sutter Slough, where WSEs could potentially be affected by  
22 construction of the proposed north Delta intakes as part of the project alternatives. The upstream  
23 boundary (i.e., the confluence of the Sacramento River and American River) was selected due to its  
24 relevance as a major control point for flood management; moreover, there was no indication of  
25 additional upstream effects on WSEs beyond this upstream boundary. The downstream boundary  
26 (i.e., Sutter Slough) was selected because Sutter Slough is sufficiently downstream from the  
27 proposed north Delta intakes, and there are no significant inflows or flow splits between the  
28 American River confluence and Sutter Slough. The use of this reach for impact assessment was  
29 supported by modeled results.

30 The areas adjacent to this reach of the Sacramento River are protected by SPFC levees and thus are  
31 under USACE's, DWR's, and CVFPP's jurisdictions. Therefore, the best available information, tools,  
32 and evaluation methods used for project impact assessment are consistent with those for the 2022  
33 CVFPP Update (California Department of Water Resources 2022a). The Sacramento River hydraulic  
34 river model used for project impact analysis was extracted from the full Sacramento River system  
35 model developed by DWR for use in the preparation of the 2022 CVFPP Update. This 1-D model used  
36 for the 2022 CVFPP Update was enhanced to a full 2-D steady-state Sacramento River system  
37 Hydrologic Engineering Center River Analysis System (HEC-RAS) model using new bathymetry data  
38 and light detection and ranging topography collected by DWR in 2018 and 2019 (Delta Conveyance  
39 Design and Construction Authority 2022e:3, 8-9). The CVFPPB provided the flood hydrology from the  
40 2022 CVFPP Update for use in this assessment. These profiles are similar to the flood profiles used  
41 in the 2017 CVFPP Update, based on 1997 flood hydrology with a scaling factor, but include more  
42 conservative estimates for climate-change-induced hydrology and sea level rise.

1 The impact assessment used model assumptions and data that are consistent with the 2022 CVFPP  
2 Update. This includes the use of existing conditions and future conditions considered in the 2022  
3 CVFPP Update. The planning horizon for the CVFPP is 50 years; therefore, for the 2022 CVFPP  
4 Update, existing conditions are set in 2022 and future conditions in 2072. Although different from  
5 the existing (i.e., 2020) and future conditions (i.e., 2040) used for the other analysis in this chapter  
6 (i.e., Impact FP-2) and the other resource areas in the Draft EIR, the use of CVFPP existing conditions  
7 in 2022 and future conditions in 2072 are considered important to stay consistent with governing  
8 regulatory framework, and the use of best available tools and information for environmental review  
9 purposes. Correspondingly, 2022 conditions are used for existing conditions and all project  
10 alternatives to evaluate the potential impacts on WSEs of the Sacramento River from construction.  
11 The No Project Alternative scenario for this analysis assesses WSE impacts in the Sacramento River  
12 under 2072 conditions relative to existing conditions (i.e., 2022).

13 While no current guidance exists for use of specific climate scenarios under CEQA, per OPC, the H++  
14 scenario, or extreme risk aversion scenario, is recommended and relevant for high-stakes, long-term  
15 decisions and for projects with a lifespan beyond 2050 that have a low risk tolerance. The 2072  
16 conditions for the 2022 CVFPP Update include climate change conditions, reflected in hydrology and  
17 sea level rise, that are consistent to that are used for the Draft EIR's 2040 conditions for the No  
18 Project Alternative—although further in the future and with more pronounced effects. For example,  
19 the H++ sea level rise projection in 2040 is 1.8 feet, while the sea level rise projection in 2072 used  
20 by 2022 CVFPP Update is 3.7 feet. This is considered more conservative for project impact  
21 assessment. A more detailed description of the climate change and sea level rise projections for this  
22 Draft EIR can be found in Chapter 4, *Framework for the Environmental Analysis*, Chapter 30, *Climate*  
23 *Change*, and the 2022 CVFPP Update (California Department of Water Resources 2022a).

24 As previously mentioned, the modeled reach of the Sacramento River includes urban levees  
25 extending south from the American River confluence to around the town of Freeport that are for  
26 protecting Sacramento urban areas; these areas are subject to Urban Level of Flood Protection (i.e.,  
27 200-year level of flood protection) (Figure 7-2). Within the modeled reach, the remaining levees  
28 downstream of the town of Freeport are considered rural or nonurban levees that are not subject to  
29 the Urban Level of Flood Protection. Therefore, for completeness of the construction assessment for  
30 each project alternative, it is necessary to evaluate the impacts on WSEs of the Sacramento River for  
31 100- and 200-year flood events under existing conditions (i.e., 2022). Figure 7-2 includes a map of  
32 the urban and nonurban levees along the Sacramento River between the American River confluence  
33 and Sutter Slough.

34 For evaluating impacts from construction of the project alternatives, the construction footprint,  
35 including cofferdams, was evaluated in the Sacramento River hydraulic river model. All WSE  
36 differences except the No Project Alternative were calculated based on the model differences  
37 between the flood event run with and without project facilities in place. The maximum WSE  
38 differences in the reach of the Sacramento River from the American River confluence to Sutter  
39 Slough for both the 100-year and 200-year flood events were used for comparative purposes.  
40 Alternatives 1, 2a, 3, 4a, and 5 were specifically modeled using the Sacramento River hydraulic river  
41 model to evaluate the impact from construction of the intakes on WSEs of the Sacramento River.  
42 Alternatives 2b, 2c, 4b, and 4c, with their smaller capacities (3,000 cfs and 4,500 cfs) and smaller  
43 footprints, were not modeled because the resulting WSE increases would be similar to or less than  
44 the corresponding alternative of the same alignment but larger capacity. After a project alternative  
45 is selected, and in consideration of any changes made to the intake configuration during design, the  
46 modeling would be reconducted to support project permitting and final design. More detailed

1 hydraulic evaluations concerning hydraulic loading, scour, and erosion forces at the interface  
2 between the intake structures and the river terrain as a result of increased WSEs would be done as  
3 part of the final project design for construction phase and for operation phase with final installed  
4 facilities. During these evaluations, the specific size and extent of slope protection would be verified  
5 and revised, if needed. The construction impacts were only evaluated for existing conditions (i.e.,  
6 2022 conditions) but not future conditions (i.e., 2072 conditions). A more detailed description of the  
7 modeling tool and analysis are included in the Sacramento River Flood Flow Hydraulic Modeling  
8 Technical Memorandum in Attachment A of the EPR (Delta Conveyance Design and Construction  
9 Authority 2022e).

10 For 408 permit requirements, the assessment for potential flood protection impacts from  
11 construction was also evaluated using flood flows consistent with those used to develop the 1957  
12 USACE Sacramento River Project Levee design profiles, which was the basis of the levee design  
13 when the SRFCP was constructed, representing the anticipated level of performance in terms of  
14 channel flow carrying capacity. The 1957 design profile assessment will be utilized by USACE and  
15 CVFPB as part of their permitting process to demonstrate that project construction would not  
16 impede the continued functions of the levees and channels as originally designed. The evaluation for  
17 the potential impacts on the 1957 levee design profile is not considered part of the CEQA analysis  
18 because the 1957 levee design profile was defined in association of a specific design flow used in the  
19 original facility construction. However, it is a necessary evaluation for the permitting process in  
20 addition to the CEQA analysis. The detail of the analysis using the 1957 levee profiles are provided  
21 in Appendix 7B, *Evaluation against U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1957 Design Profiles*.

22 Additional analyses for velocity near intakes and potential risks of erosion and scouring will be  
23 performed for the final design to meet permit requirements.

## 24 **Twin Cities Complex (Impact FP-2)**

25 The Twin Cities Complex site is located on the Glanville Tract in the Mokelumne River watershed  
26 just north of the confluence of the Cosumnes River. Due to the unregulated Cosumnes River, limited  
27 Mokelumne River channel conveyance, and downstream tidal conditions, the area around the Twin  
28 Cities Complex site has a history of flooding. The potential impacts on flood extents and depths in  
29 the area surrounding the Twin Cities Complex site that could result from the construction footprint  
30 were evaluated using the north Delta hydraulic model.

31 The north Delta hydraulic model was first created for Sacramento County and was later applied by  
32 DWR in the McCormack-Williamson Tract Project (Delta Conveyance Design and Construction  
33 Authority 2022d:Att 3-3). This coupled 1-D/2-D HEC-RAS model incorporates topographic and  
34 bathymetric data collected by DWR between 2007 and 2016 and was applied to evaluate the effects  
35 of the construction footprint around the Twin Cities Complex site on the 1% AEP flood (Delta  
36 Conveyance Design and Construction Authority 2022d:Att 3-2).

37 The north Delta hydraulic model was used for this evaluation because the model was calibrated to  
38 historical flood event gage data and high-water marks for floods at this location while applied to  
39 project evaluation for the McCormack-Williamson Tract Project, which is part of the DWR's North  
40 Delta Flood Control and Ecosystem Restoration Project for floodplain restoration and flood peak  
41 reduction. When the McCormack-Williamson Tract Project is completed, the potential flood depth  
42 near the Twin Cities Complex site is expected to be lower than the existing conditions. However, the  
43 completion date for the McCormack-Williamson Tract Project is not known at this time, so analysis  
44 was conducted assuming there was no such project, which results in a conservative evaluation.



1 The potential impacts from construction of the project alternatives at the Twin Cities Complex were  
2 evaluated by examining the effects of the construction footprint that includes a ring levee  
3 surrounding all facilities during construction. The ring levee height was designed based on a FEMA  
4 100-year flood depth outside of Glanville Tract within the adjacent floodway, so several feet of  
5 freeboard are available for the current analysis. Construction impacts were evaluated for existing  
6 conditions (i.e., 2020 conditions), but not future conditions (i.e., 2040 conditions). A more detailed  
7 description of the flood effect analysis for the Twin Cities Complex site can be found in the Flood  
8 Risk Management Technical Memorandum in Attachment H of the EPR (Delta Conveyance Design  
9 and Construction Authority 2022d, 2022f).

## 10 Indicators of Potential Impacts

11 The potential impacts from the construction of the project alternatives were evaluated based on:

- 12 • Changes in the resulting WSEs of the Sacramento River between the confluence of the American  
13 River and Sutter Slough (Impact FP-1). The increase in WSEs in the Sacramento River was used  
14 as an indicator for potential impacts on flood protection for the adjacent urban and nonurban  
15 areas.
- 16 • Changes in the extent of flooding at the proposed north Delta intakes, Southern Complex, tunnel  
17 shaft sites, or other project feature (Impact FP-2). The increase in flood depth or area was used as  
18 an indicator for potential impacts on Delta flood protection.
- 19 • Changes in the flood depth and areal extent of the 100-year flood event surrounding the Twin  
20 Cities Complex site (Impact FP-2). The increase in flood depth or area was used as an indicator  
21 for potential impacts on Delta flood protection.

22 Refer to Section 7.3.2, *Thresholds of Significance*, for more information about the significance  
23 criterion associated with this impact on riverine flooding from operations of the project alternatives.

### 24 7.3.1.3 Assessing Potential Flood Protection Impacts during Operations 25 Phase

26 Based on the above process and methods of review, operation of the project alternatives could  
27 affect: (1) WSEs of the Sacramento River between the confluence of the American River and Sutter  
28 Slough (near the proposed north Delta intakes); (2) the depth and areal extent of the 100-year flood  
29 event at the Twin Cities Complex site; and (3) a channel (i.e., Italian Slough) and adjacent areas  
30 located downstream of the Southern Forebay Emergency Spillway. The first effect is related to the  
31 placement of north Delta intakes along the Sacramento River with SPFC levees and, therefore, the  
32 data, tools, and analyses would be consistent with the 2022 CVFPP Update. The other two are  
33 related to impeding or redirecting localized flood flow by project permanent facilities and, thus,  
34 FEMA NFIP methodology is followed. The following provides location-specific analyses.

#### 35 North Delta Intakes on Sacramento River (Impact FP-1)

36 The tools and methods for evaluating potential impacts on WSEs of the Sacramento River between  
37 the American River confluence and Sutter Slough during operations of the project alternatives are  
38 generally the same as those described in Section 7.1.3.2, *Assessing Potential Flood Protection Impacts  
39 from Construction*, for evaluating potential impacts from construction of the proposed north Delta  
40 intakes. Therefore, the reasons and choices of tools, data, and methods are not repeated herein.  
41 infrastructure that includes the intake training walls, cylindrical tee screen structure, and log boom.

1 WSE differences are due to the permanent footprint of the intake facilities and are not directly  
2 related to diversions at the proposed north Delta intakes; modeling was completed without  
3 diversions occurring to provide a more conservative estimate of potential impacts. Unlike the  
4 evaluation of potential impacts from construction of the proposed north Delta intakes, the impacts  
5 during operations were evaluated for both existing conditions (i.e., 2022 conditions) and future  
6 conditions (i.e., 2072 conditions) with climate change, including corresponding hydrologic change  
7 and sea level rise. Appendix 7A, *Flood Protection 2040/2072 Analysis*, presents potential impacts on  
8 flood protection that could result from the project alternatives under future conditions.

9 The assessment for potential flood protection impacts during operations was also evaluated using  
10 flood flows consistent with those used to develop the 1957 USACE Sacramento River Project Levee  
11 design profiles. As previously mentioned, this analysis is expected to be used by USACE and CVFPB  
12 for permitting purposes. The detail of the analysis using the 1957 levee profile are provided in  
13 Appendix 7B.

#### 14 **Twin Cities Complex (Impact FP-2)**

15 The tools and methods for evaluating potential impacts on local flood flows in the 100-year  
16 floodplain during operations of the project alternatives at the Twin Cities Complex site are the same  
17 as those described for evaluating potential impacts from construction of the permanent facilities at  
18 the Twin Cities Complex site for the central, eastern, and Bethany Reservoir alignments. Therefore,  
19 the reasons and choices of tools, data, and methods is not repeated herein. the effects of the  
20 permanent shafts and stockpile storage areas for the eastern and Bethany Reservoir alignments  
21 after the temporary ring levee is removed. The permanent stockpile for the central alignment is  
22 smaller than that of the eastern alignment and thus would have less of an effect in increasing flood  
23 depth adjacent to the facility during flooding. A more detailed description of the flood effect analysis  
24 and hydraulic model scenarios for the Twin Cities Complex site can be found in the Flood Risk  
25 Management technical manuals of the EPRs (Delta Conveyance Design and Construction Authority  
26 2022d, 2022f).

#### 27 **Southern Forebay (Impact FP-2)**

28 The Southern Forebay is located on Byron Tract—an area that is already protected by levees that  
29 substantially meet the PL 84-99 criteria. Consequently, the Southern Forebay would not include any  
30 facilities within the 100-year flood hazard area and would instead be located in an area that is  
31 considered a reduced risk (Figure 7-1). During the design phase, local irrigation and drainage  
32 facilities near the proposed Southern Forebay will be evaluated in detail for potential localized  
33 impacts from the forebay construction and operation, and associated mitigation needs, if any. If the  
34 facilities used by adjacent properties to move water from the existing diversion are located on a  
35 parcel to be used for a project feature, pipelines or canals would be installed to maintain service to  
36 the adjacent properties.

37 As previously mentioned, the Southern Forebay would be designed to meet the requirements of  
38 DSOD for jurisdictional dams, including an emergency spillway. The hydraulic design of the  
39 Southern Forebay Emergency Spillway would be based on controlling events, including rare  
40 emergency operation of the system (e.g., if the pumps were on and the downstream gates closed  
41 unexpectedly such as with a power outage) or uncontrolled flood flow through the conveyance  
42 system (e.g., system intake gates open accompanied by power outage during high river stage leading

1 to uncontrolled gravity flow into the Southern Forebay). These control events are based on facility  
2 design and the resulting flow conditions will not change from existing conditions to future.

3 An inflow of 7,500 cfs was selected for this analysis because it represents the highest possible inflow  
4 for all project alternatives. All other project alternatives would result in lower spillway flows and  
5 lower potential hydraulic impact. Uncontrolled gravity flow through the system with the intake  
6 gates open would potentially result in a longer event but at lesser flow due to frictional head losses  
7 through the system. A qualitative analysis was conducted for the resulting flow path for assessing  
8 the potential effects on flood protection. To assess the hydraulic impact of operating the Southern  
9 Forebay Emergency Spillway on the existing levee system of Italian Slough and Old River, a 1-D  
10 model was developed of the channel and levees using HEC-RAS. The probability of the emergency  
11 spillway being operated is very low due to project operations and is assumed to be independent of  
12 hydrologic conditions. Nevertheless, two hydrologic conditions were analyzed to estimate a  
13 potential range of WSE impacts: a 100-year flood event and a mean higher high water event if the  
14 emergency spillway was used. The downstream WSE on Old River was assumed to be 10 feet for the  
15 100-year event and 5 feet for the mean higher high water event. A range of operational scenarios  
16 were modeled to assess potential impacts on the existing levee system during a Southern Forebay  
17 spill event. Spillway releases were assumed to be equal to the project pumping capacities of 3,000,  
18 4,500, 6,000, and 7,500 cfs over a 12-hour period. See the Southern Forebay Emergency Spillway  
19 Siting Analysis Technical Memorandum in Attachment D of the EPR for additional detail on the  
20 analysis (Delta Conveyance Design and Construction Authority 2022c).

## 21 Indicators for Potential Impacts

22 The potential impacts from the operations of the project alternatives were evaluated based on:

- 23 • Changes in the resulting WSEs of the Sacramento River between the confluence of the American  
24 River and Sutter Slough (Impact FP-1). The increase in WSEs in the Sacramento River was used  
25 as an indicator for potential impacts on flood protection for the adjacent urban and nonurban  
26 areas.
- 27 • Changes in the depth and areal extent of the 100-year flood event surrounding the Twin Cities  
28 Complex site (Impact FP-2). The increase in flood depth or area was used as an indicator for  
29 potential impacts on Delta flood protection.
- 30 • Increases in risk of flooding by emergency release through the Southern Forebay Emergency  
31 Spillway (Impact FP-2). The indicator is based on evaluation if the emergency releases could  
32 affect levees and associated protected area.

33 Refer to Section 7.3.2 for more information about the significance criterion associated with this  
34 impact on riverine flooding from operations of the project alternatives.

## 35 7.3.2 Thresholds of Significance

36 Based on Appendix G of the CEQA Guidelines, the impact analysis for flood protection would assume  
37 a project alternative would have a significant impact under CEQA if the project would do any of the  
38 following.

- 39 • Cause a substantial increase in WSEs of the Sacramento River between the American River  
40 confluence and Sutter Slough (Impact FP-1).

- Alter the existing drainage pattern of the site or area, including through the alteration of the course of a stream or river, or substantially increase the rate or amount of surface runoff in a manner that would result in flooding on-site or off-site or impede or redirect flood flows (Impact FP-2).

For purposes of this analysis, WSE modeling results that show less than a 0.1 foot increase in WSE would not be considered a substantial increase. Table 7-1 includes a comparison of the reference years used for the existing and future conditions associated with each impact analysis in this chapter.

**Table 7-1. Comparison of Reference Years Used for Flood Protection Impact Analyses**

Impact	Existing Conditions/ Project Alternatives	No Project Alternative	Notes (see Section 7.3.1.1 for more detail)
<b>Impact FP-1:</b> Cause a Substantial Increase in Water Surface Elevations of the Sacramento River between the American River Confluence and Sutter Slough	2022	2072	Consistent with the planning horizon used in the 2022 CVFPP Update
<b>Impact FP-2:</b> Alter the Existing Drainage Pattern of the Site or Area, including through the Alteration of the Course of a Stream or River, or Substantially Increase the Rate or Amount of Surface Runoff in a Manner That Would Result in Flooding On- or Off-Site or Impede or Redirect Flood Flows	2020	2040	Consistent with all other resource impact assessments in the Draft EIR

Note: For potential flood protection impacts on areas that receive protection from the SPFC in the study area (i.e., Impact FP-1), reference years were selected to maintain consistency with the planning horizon used in the 2022 CVFPP Update. For potential flood protection impacts on areas that do not receive protection from the SPFC in the study area (i.e., Impact FP-2), reference years were selected to maintain consistency with all other resource assessments in this Draft EIR.

### 7.3.2.1 Evaluation of Mitigation Impacts

CEQA also requires an evaluation of potential impacts caused by the mitigation measures. Following the CEQA conclusion for each impact, the chapter analyzes potential impacts associated with implementing both the Compensatory Mitigation Plan (CMP) and the other mitigation measures required to address with potential impacts caused by the project. Mitigation impacts are considered in combination with project impacts in determining the overall significance of the project. Additional information regarding the analysis of mitigation measure impacts is provided in Chapter 4, *Framework for the Environmental Analysis*.

## 7.3.3 Impacts and Mitigation Approaches

### 7.3.3.1 No Project Alternative

As described in Chapter 3, *Description of the Proposed Project and Alternatives*, CEQA Guidelines Section 15126.6 directs that an EIR evaluate a specific alternative of “no project” along with its impact. The No Project Alternative in this Draft EIR represents the circumstances under which the project (or project alternative) does not proceed and considers predictable actions, such as projects,

1 plans, and programs, that would be predicted to occur in the foreseeable future if the Delta  
2 Conveyance Project is not constructed and operated. This includes the water-supply-related actions  
3 that would be pursued by public water agencies participating in the Delta Conveyance Project in  
4 their respective service areas. This section considers how flood protection in the Delta could change  
5 over time, discusses how other predictable actions could affect flood protection, and summarizes the  
6 modeled changes in flood protection that may occur in the project study area under the No Project  
7 Alternative.

## 8 **Predictable Water-Supply Related Actions by Public Water Agencies**

9 A list and description of actions included as part of the No Project Alternative are provided in  
10 Appendix 3C, *Defining Existing Conditions, No Project Alternative, and Cumulative Impact Conditions*.  
11 As described in Chapter 4, the No Project Alternative analyses focus on the additional water-supply-  
12 related actions public water agencies may opt to follow if the project does not occur.

13 Public water agencies participating in the project have been grouped into four geographic regions.  
14 The water agencies within each geographic region would likely pursue a similar suite of water  
15 supply projects under the No Project Alternative (Appendix 3C). Activities associated with the  
16 various water supply projects could temporarily alter localized drainage patterns and stream  
17 courses, resulting in changes to surface water runoff and elevations, all of which could potentially  
18 exceed the capacities of stormwater management facilities. Construction impacts are expected to be  
19 primarily associated with construction of distribution pipelines; however, construction of these  
20 facilities would not be expected to result in substantial changes to drainage patterns or increases in  
21 surface water runoff because disturbed areas would generally be returned to pre-project conditions.  
22 In addition, distribution pipelines would mostly be below-ground and would not affect drainage  
23 patterns.

24 It is expected that water supply facilities would be located in upland areas to the greatest extent  
25 possible and would not be situated within flood inundation zones so as not to alter existing drainage  
26 patterns. Operational activities typically include inspection, monitoring, testing, maintenance, and  
27 facility operations. These activities are not expected to affect the ability of river, stream, or drainage  
28 channels to safely pass high flow events; expose people or structures to a significant risk of loss,  
29 injury, or death involving flooding; or result in substantial changes in the rate or amount of runoff or  
30 impede or redirect flood flows. O&M activities for the water supply projects are not expected to  
31 require substantial or sustained discharge of water to existing waterbodies. Operation of  
32 desalination plants includes discharge of brine and distribution of product water. Discharge of brine  
33 is typically accomplished through isolated discharge pipes to the ocean or into injection wells and  
34 would not increase flows in rivers, streams, or drainage channels.

## 35 **Future Conditions of Flood Protection in the Delta**

36 Under the No Project Alternative, various factors contributing to Delta flood risks remain and  
37 existing levee maintenance requirements and practices in the Delta are assumed to continue. These  
38 practices include continued improvements to overcome subsidence and sea level rise with  
39 potentially substantial costs, as the usable areas within Delta islands would continue to reduce  
40 (assuming no future improvements in levee crest elevations). Implementation of projects to reverse  
41 the trend of subsidence will also continue where opportunities exist. The threat of seismic activities  
42 on Delta levees will also persist with possibly increasing chance of occurrence but without specific  
43 predictions of when and where.

1 The high variability of precipitation makes it difficult to detect a strong signal in future projections  
2 and is one of the least certain aspects of climate models, especially when applied at the regional level  
3 because climate models do not resolve many of the fine-scale and complex interactions that occur  
4 locally (Delta Stewardship Council 2021:3-13). Uncertainty regarding precipitation projections is  
5 greatest in the northern part of California, where most of the snowfall and rainfall in the state  
6 occurs. However, climate models do project precipitation to change under warming conditions,  
7 resulting in more frequent rainfall events and less frequent snowfall events (He et al. 2019:11).  
8 Warming air temperatures are expected to shift the timing and volume of snowmelt in the Sierra  
9 Nevada to earlier in the spring as well. Changing precipitation patterns and an earlier snowmelt  
10 would lead to shorter, more intense spring periods of river flow and freshwater discharge,  
11 consequently affecting inflows into the Delta.

12 Future surface water conditions are expected to change considerably when compared to existing  
13 conditions due to sea level rise and a shift in hydrologic patterns as a result of climate change.  
14 Within the study area, sea level rise conditions under the No Project Alternative could be expected  
15 to increase the duration of high-water conditions in Delta channels, decrease flood protection, and  
16 increase flood risk relative to existing conditions. The trend would be further amplified by changing  
17 hydrology and storm patterns under climate change.

18 Sea level rise and changes in hydrologic patterns in Delta watersheds could be expected to increase  
19 peak water levels and flooding in the Delta in the coming decades, exposing additional land to  
20 flooding in the future (Delta Stewardship Council 2021:5-6). In some parts of the Delta, the existing  
21 freeboard—while effective in reducing current flood risk—will decrease and potentially be  
22 exceeded in the future as peak water levels increase in response to climate change (assuming no  
23 future improvements in levee crest elevations).

24 As previously discussed in Section 7.3.1, *Methods for Analysis*, and shown in Table 7-1, two different  
25 sets of reference years are used for flood impact assessments to be consistent with corresponding  
26 regulatory frameworks. For potential flood protection impacts on areas that do receive protection  
27 from the SPFC (i.e., Impact FP-1), the year 2072 was used for the No Project Alternative, consistent  
28 with the 2022 CVFPP Update. For potential flood protection impacts related to impeding or  
29 redirecting localized flood flow (i.e., Impact FP-2), the year 2040 was used for the No Project  
30 Alternative, consistent with the evaluation of other resource areas in this Draft EIR.

31 The analysis for Impact FP-1 is closely related to the potential impact on Delta flood risks with  
32 hydrologic conditions and sea level rise under climate change. The changes in WSE of the  
33 Sacramento River between the American River confluence and Sutter Slough under the No Project  
34 Alternative (2072 conditions) compared to the existing conditions (2022 conditions) were  
35 evaluated using the previously mentioned Sacramento River hydraulic model with climate change  
36 hydrology and a projected sea level rise of 3.7 feet by 2072, conditions consistent with the 2022  
37 CVFPP Update. Because of this, future WSEs under the No Project Alternative were evaluated at  
38 2072. Under the No Project Alternative, WSEs for the 100-year flood event would increase by a  
39 maximum of 0.40 foot (river mile [RM] 45.6; see Figure 7-2 for the corresponding location) in the  
40 river reaches with urban levees and 0.60 foot (RM 37.0) in the river reaches with nonurban levees  
41 when compared to existing conditions (Table 7-2). Under the No Project Alternative, WSEs for the  
42 200-year flood event would increase by a maximum of 0.70 foot (RM 45.6) in the river reaches with  
43 urban levees and 0.90 foot (RM 37.0) in the river reaches with nonurban levees when compared to  
44 existing conditions. As shown in Table 7-2, increases in WSEs simulated in the Sacramento River  
45 under the No Project Alternative would result in increases in flood risk in the Delta. These increases

1 in WSEs are contributed to by increases in flood flow due to changes in hydrology and sea level rise  
2 because of climate change since the high-water stage in the Delta channels is mostly influenced by  
3 tide and storm surges.

4 There was no specific analysis conducted for Impact FP-2. Under the No Project Alternative for FP-2,  
5 the projected sea level rise would be up to 1.8 feet

6 The No Project Alternative encompasses water supply projects adopted during the early stages of  
7 development of this Draft EIR, facilities that are permitted or under construction during the early  
8 stages of development of this Draft EIR, projects that are permitted or are assumed to be  
9 constructed by 2040/2072. The above identified local and regional water supply projects could  
10 result in localized impacts on flood protection and may require mitigations before implementation.  
11 Because these projects are expected to be within the service areas of public water agencies, they  
12 would not result in additional flood protection impacts in the Delta.

### 13 **7.3.3.2 Impacts of the Project Alternatives on Flood Protection**

#### 14 **Impact FP-1: Cause a Substantial Increase in Water Surface Elevations of the Sacramento** 15 **River between the American River Confluence and Sutter Slough**

##### 16 *All Project Alternatives*

17 All nine project alternatives (i.e., Alternatives 1, 2a, 2b, 2c, 3, 4a, 4b, 4c, and 5) would have similar  
18 impact levels and are discussed together. This impact analysis discusses potential impacts on flood  
19 protection that could result from the project alternatives when compared to existing conditions.  
20 Because the area being evaluated for this impact (i.e., the Sacramento River between the American  
21 River confluence and Sutter Slough) receives protection from the SPFC, the project alternatives and  
22 existing conditions are both evaluated under 2022 conditions to maintain consistency with the  
23 planning horizon used in the 2022 CVFPP Update. Appendix 7A presents potential impacts on flood  
24 protection that could result from the project alternatives when compared to the No Project  
25 Alternative under future conditions. See Table 7-1 for a comparison of the reference years used for  
26 the existing and future conditions associated with each impact analysis in this chapter.

##### 27 Project Construction

28 Intake construction would include on-bank facilities that could encroach into the existing river cross  
29 section in the Sacramento River at the northern end of the Delta and require work on the SPFC levee  
30 nearby as described in Chapter 3. During construction, a temporary levee designed to comply with  
31 California Code of Regulations Title 23 and Urban Levee Design Criteria would be built at the intake  
32 site adjacent to but landward of the existing SPFC levee. This temporary levee would provide an  
33 equivalent, or higher, level of flood protection to adjacent properties as the existing SPFC levee and  
34 allow the intake facilities to be constructed along the Sacramento River while maintaining  
35 continuous flood protection. State Route (SR) 160 would be relocated on top of the temporary levee.  
36 As excavation continues on the intake site, a new permanent SPFC levee would be constructed  
37 around the perimeter of the sedimentation basin and intake outlet channel. The new SPFC levee  
38 would extend to the existing jurisdictional levee at the north and south ends of the intake structure  
39 and would be designed to protect the site and surrounding area to flood control standards that could  
40 accommodate a 200-year flood event with sea level rise. This level of protection exceeds the  
41 requirements of both USACE and CVFPPB. Following construction of the intake structure, SR 160

1 would be relocated to approximately its original location east of the intake structure near the  
2 Sacramento River.

3 To minimize encroachment of the intake structure into the river flow cross section and minimize the  
4 associated impact on flood flow WSEs, the bathymetry and riverbank configuration must  
5 accommodate construction of the intake structure and associated training walls while meeting flood  
6 criteria. Because the Sacramento River has overlapping jurisdictions across various federal and state  
7 agencies, the intake facilities would be evaluated using the CVFPB flood profiles and be designed in  
8 compliance with USACE goals to limit the rise of maximum WSEs to within the original design profile  
9 with minimal impacts, in accordance with multiple-dimensional modeling results.

10 Project construction would require temporary in-river cofferdam structures at the proposed north  
11 Delta intakes. The cofferdams would enable construction of the intakes and provide a contractor-  
12 selected level of construction phase flood protection within the confines of the cofferdams. The  
13 cofferdam would be placed in a configuration to reduce hydraulic impacts on the Sacramento River.  
14 Temporary measures that would be in place during certain construction sequences, such as the  
15 cofferdam or the temporary jurisdictional levee, would be removed either fully or partially after the  
16 completion of applicable construction tasks. Partially removed temporary features would not be  
17 included as part of permanent SPFC facilities. While there may be minor increases in WSE at the  
18 proposed north Delta intakes during construction, any construction would be done to limit the rise  
19 in WSEs and therefore avoid a substantial increase.

20 The potential impacts on WSE from the construction of the intake structures (where a cofferdam is  
21 used along the riverbank of the Sacramento River) were examined using a hydraulic model covering  
22 the Sacramento River between the American River confluence and Sutter Slough. The proposed  
23 north Delta intakes are located in a river reach of the Sacramento River with nonurban levees (100-  
24 year level of flood protection), although project construction could affect river reaches with urban  
25 levees (200-year level of flood protection) upstream that are under CVFPB's jurisdiction. Figure 7-2  
26 includes a map of the urban and nonurban levees along the Sacramento River between the American  
27 River confluence and Sutter Slough.

28 Under Alternatives 1, 3, and 5, WSEs for the 100- and 200-year flood event would increase by a  
29 maximum of 0.08 foot (RM 45.6; see Figure 7-2 for the corresponding location) in the river reaches  
30 with urban levees and 0.10 foot (RM 40.0) in the river reaches with nonurban levees when  
31 compared to existing conditions (Table 7-2). Under Alternatives 2a and 4a, WSEs for the 100-year  
32 flood event would increase by a maximum of 0.10 foot (RM 47.6) in the river reaches with urban  
33 levees and 0.11 foot (RM 42.0) in the river reaches with nonurban levees when compared to existing  
34 conditions. Under Alternatives 2a and 4a, WSEs for the 200-year flood event would increase by a  
35 maximum of 0.10 foot (RM 47.6) in the river reaches with urban levees and 0.12 foot (RM 42.0) in  
36 the river reaches with nonurban levees when compared to existing conditions. Alternatives 2b, 2c,  
37 4b, and 4c (3,000-cfs and 4,500-cfs capacity alternatives) were not modeled because WSE impacts  
38 would be similar to, or less than, Alternatives 1 and 3 (6,000-cfs capacity alternatives). Table 7-2  
39 presents the WSE differences between the project alternatives and existing conditions in the  
40 Sacramento River during project construction that are discussed here. See the Sacramento River  
41 Flood Flow Hydraulic Modeling Technical Memorandum in Attachment A of the EPR for additional  
42 detail (Delta Conveyance Design and Construction Authority 2022e).

43 All increases in WSEs of the Sacramento River due to construction of the conveyance facilities are  
44 relatively small. Therefore, construction of the conveyance facilities under Alternatives 1, 2b, 2c, 3,



1 4b, 4c, and 5 would not substantially increase WSEs near the intakes. However, construction of the  
2 conveyance facilities under Alternatives 2a and 4a (i.e., 7,500-cfs alternatives with all three intakes)  
3 would result in increases in WSEs near the intakes that are considered significant. For a multiyear  
4 period during construction, a sheet pile cofferdam must be installed in the river to allow  
5 construction of the concrete structure at each facility. While the construction cofferdam of two  
6 intake facilities built at the same time does not significantly increase the WSE during a flood event,  
7 the concurrent construction of a third intake cofferdam (as is the case in Alternatives 2a and 4a)  
8 does raise the WSE slightly over the 0.10-foot threshold. Supported by the analyses of other  
9 alternatives, phased construction of three intakes would alleviate the significant WSE increases.

10 Mitigation Measure FP-1: *Phased Construction of the Proposed North Delta Intakes* would address  
11 substantial changes in Sacramento River WSEs estimated to occur during construction of  
12 Alternatives 2a and 4a.

### 13 Postconstruction Effects during Operation

14 The nature of the proposed north Delta intake structures requires placement along the bank of the  
15 Sacramento River, with the structure projecting into flowing water. This effectively constricts a  
16 portion of the conveyance capacity of the river along the respective length of each intake. This in  
17 turn may cause a rise in WSE upstream of the intakes. This rise in WSE is dependent on the  
18 combination of intakes used to achieve the project needs. The major features of the intake structures  
19 that affect Sacramento River hydraulics are the intake training walls and the structural elements  
20 supporting the fish screens that encroach into the river. The structure's protective log boom and  
21 debris fender pile system could also affect river hydraulics. The debris fender and log boom—  
22 provided to protect the fish screen structures from damage by floating and near surface debris—  
23 may collect debris periodically, especially during or after storm runoff.

24 The potential impact on WSE in the Sacramento River between the American River confluence and  
25 Sutter Slough during operation of the intake structures was examined using the same hydraulic  
26 model for assessing impacts during construction discussed in the preceding subsection. As  
27 previously discussed, the potential impact on WSEs during operations of the project alternatives are  
28 not directly related to diversions at the proposed north Delta intakes. Instead, the following  
29 discussion related to "operational" impacts evaluates the effects that are a result of the permanent  
30 facility footprint. The proposed north Delta intakes are located in a river reach of the Sacramento  
31 River with nonurban levees (100-year level of flood protection), although the permanent footprint  
32 of the intake facilities could affect river reaches with urban levees (200-year level of flood  
33 protection) upstream, which are under CVFPB jurisdiction. Figure 7-2 includes a map of the urban  
34 and nonurban levees along the Sacramento River between the American River confluence and Sutter  
35 Slough.

36 Under Alternatives 1 and 3, WSEs for both the 100- and 200-year flood event would increase by a  
37 maximum of 0.03 foot (RM 45.6; see Figure 7-2 for the corresponding location) in the river reaches  
38 with urban levees and 0.04 foot (RM 40.0) in the river reaches with nonurban levees when  
39 compared to existing conditions (Table 7-2). Under Alternatives 2a and 4a, WSEs for the 100-year  
40 flood event would increase by a maximum of 0.04 foot (RM 47.6) in the river reaches with urban  
41 levees and 0.05 foot (RM 40.4) in the river reaches with nonurban levees when compared to existing  
42 conditions. Under Alternatives 2a and 4a, WSEs for the 200-year flood event would increase by a  
43 maximum of 0.05 foot (RM 47.6) in the river reaches with urban levees and 0.05 foot (RM 40.4) in  
44 the river reaches with nonurban levees when compared to existing conditions. Under Alternative 5,

1 WSEs for the 100- and 200-year flood event would increase by a maximum of 0.03 foot (RM 45.6) in  
2 the river reaches with urban levees and 0.04 foot (RM 40.4) in the river reaches with nonurban  
3 levees when compared to existing conditions. Alternatives 2b, 2c, 4b, and 4c (3,000-cfs and 4,500-cfs  
4 capacity alternatives) were not modeled since WSE impacts would be similar to, or less than,  
5 Alternatives 1 and 3 (6,000-cfs capacity alternatives). Table 7-2 presents the WSE differences  
6 between the project alternatives and existing conditions in the Sacramento River during project  
7 operations that are discussed here. See the Sacramento River Flood Flow Hydraulic Modeling HEC-  
8 RAS 2D Technical Memorandum in Attachment A of the EPR for additional detail (Delta Conveyance  
9 Design and Construction Authority 2022e).

10 The permanent footprint of the conveyance facilities under all project alternatives would not  
11 substantially increase WSEs of the Sacramento River near the intakes. WSE increases during project  
12 operations would be less than the WSE increases exhibited during project construction due to the  
13 removal of the sheet pile cofferdam(s) when construction is complete. While operations of the  
14 project alternatives could divert flood flows, this would not necessarily provide a beneficial flood  
15 protection effect and was not modeled in this analysis.

**Table 7-2. Water Surface Elevation Differences for the Project Alternatives at Select Locations in the Sacramento River between the American River Confluence and Sutter Slough Relative to 2022 Conditions**

Project Alternative and Flood Flow Scenario	River Reaches with Urban Levees, Max WSE Difference Relative to EC (feet)	River Mile of Greatest WSE Difference in Urban Levee Section	River Reaches with Nonurban Levees, Max WSE Difference Relative to EC (feet)	River Mile of Greatest WSE Difference in Nonurban Levee Section
<b>Construction Phase</b>				
<i>Alternatives 1, 3, and 5</i>				
100-year Flood Event	0.08	45.6	0.10	40.0
200-year Flood Event	0.08	45.6	0.10	40.0
<i>Alternatives 2a and 4a</i>				
100-year Flood Event (without mitigation)	0.10	47.6	0.11	42.0
200-year Flood Event (without mitigation)	0.10	47.6	0.12	42.0
100-year Flood Event (with mitigation)	0.08	47.6	0.08	42.0
200-year Flood Event (with mitigation)	0.08	47.6	0.09	42.0
<b>Operations Phase (i.e., Postconstruction)</b>				
<i>No Project Alternative (2072)</i>				
100-year Flood Event	0.40	45.6	0.60	37.0
200-year Flood Event	0.70	45.6	0.90	37.0
<i>Alternatives 1, 3, and 5</i>				
100-year Flood Event	0.03	45.6	0.04	40.0
200-year Flood Event	0.03	45.6	0.04	40.0
<i>Alternatives 2a and 4a</i>				
100-year Flood Event	0.04	47.6	0.05	40.4
200-year Flood Event	0.05	47.6	0.05	40.4

Source: Delta Conveyance Design and Construction Authority 2022e.

Note: Because the Sacramento River between the American River confluence and Sutter Slough is protected by the SPFC, WSE differences between the project alternatives and existing conditions were evaluated under 2022 conditions to maintain consistency with the planning horizon in the 2022 CVFPP Update. WSEs for the No Project Alternative were modeled under 2072 conditions (to maintain consistency with the CVFPP's 50-year planning horizon) before being compared to existing conditions under 2022 conditions. Alternatives 2b, 2c, 4b, and 4c (3,000-cfs and 4,500-cfs capacity alternatives) were not modeled because WSE impacts would be similar to, or less than, Alternatives 1 and 3 (6,000-cfs capacity alternatives). The results presented in the table only examine the WSE differences within the modeled reach (i.e., the Sacramento River between the American River confluence and Sutter Slough).

cfs = cubic feet per second; EC = existing conditions; WSE = water surface elevation.

## 1 **CEQA Conclusion—All Project Alternatives**

2 The intake, sedimentation basin, and outlet channel would be designed to flood control standards  
3 that could accommodate a 200-year flood event with sea level rise for year 2100 (i.e., 10.2 feet of sea  
4 level rise at the Golden Gate Bridge) as defined by DWR. The project temporary levee developed  
5 during intake construction and the new, permanent SPFC levee after project construction would  
6 provide an equivalent or higher level of flood protection to the area currently receiving protection  
7 from the existing levee near the intakes. Therefore, the impacts of the project alternatives on the  
8 degree of flood protection near the intakes would be less than significant.

9 The nature of the water intake structures requires their placement along the bank of the Sacramento  
10 River, with the structure projecting into the flowing water. This effectively constricts a portion of the  
11 conveyance capacity of the river along the respective length of each intake. This in turn may cause a  
12 rise in WSE in the Sacramento River between the American River confluence and Sutter Slough. This  
13 rise in WSE is dependent on the river flow rate, the combination of intakes used to achieve project  
14 needs, and the phase of construction for each intake. As shown in Table 7-2, construction of the  
15 proposed north Delta intakes during the 100- and 200-year flood events would increase WSEs  
16 between 0.08 and 0.10 foot in the river reaches with urban levees and 0.10 and 0.12 foot in the river  
17 reaches with nonurban levees of the modeled study area. Operation of the proposed north Delta  
18 intakes during the 100- and 200-year flood events would increase WSEs between 0.03 and 0.05 foot  
19 in the river reaches with urban levees and 0.04 and 0.05 foot in the river reaches with nonurban  
20 levees of the modeled study area. Currently, the facility footprint includes riprap (along the intake  
21 structure, existing levee, and river bottom interface) and slope protection that is typically sufficient  
22 to mitigate localized scour and erosion forces (Delta Conveyance Design and Construction Authority  
23 2022a:76, App 7, App 8, App 76). More detailed hydraulic evaluations concerning hydraulic loading,  
24 scour, and erosion forces at the interface between the intake structures and the river terrain as a  
25 result of increased WSEs would be completed as part of the final project design. During these  
26 evaluations, the specific size and extent of slope protection would be verified and revised, if needed.

27 Construction of Alternatives 2a and 4a (i.e., 7,500-cfs alternatives with three intakes) has a  
28 potentially significant impact on WSEs during a portion of the construction phase. For a multiyear  
29 period during construction, a sheet pile cofferdam must be installed in the river to allow  
30 construction of the concrete structure at each facility. The riverside sheet pile wall of the cofferdam  
31 encroaches about 5 feet further into the river than the permanent facility, thereby increasing river  
32 velocities through the area and slightly raising WSEs due to the additional hydraulic head loss. While  
33 the construction cofferdam of two intake facilities built at the same time does not significantly  
34 increase the WSE during a flood event, the concurrent construction of a third intake cofferdam does  
35 further raise the WSE. This increase in WSE could be considered substantial when assessing flood  
36 protection impacts; therefore, based on the initial design, this impact would be considered  
37 significant.

38 If Alternatives 2a or 4a are selected, DWR will perform additional hydraulic modeling based on the  
39 final design, prior to construction of the intakes. If this future modeling indicates a substantial  
40 increase in WSE of the Sacramento River (greater than 0.10 foot) during the construction period of  
41 Intake A (the most upstream intake), Mitigation Measure FP-1: *Phased Construction of the Proposed*  
42 *North Delta Intakes* would be applied to reduce the impact to less than significant.

43 After implementation of Mitigation Measure FP-1: *Phased Construction of the Proposed North Delta*  
44 *Intakes*, Alternatives 2a and 4a—in addition to the project alternatives that did not require

1 mitigation (i.e., Alternatives 1, 2b, 2c, 3, 4b, 4c, and 5)—would have less-than-significant impacts on  
2 the level of flood protection between the American River confluence and Sutter Slough. See the  
3 Sacramento River Flood Flow Hydraulic Modeling HEC-RAS 2D Technical Memorandum in  
4 Attachment A of the EPR for model results that support the efficacy of Mitigation Measure FP-1 and  
5 the significance determination (Delta Conveyance Design and Construction Authority 2022e).

### 6 **Mitigation Measure FP-1: Phased Construction of the Proposed North Delta Intakes**

7 DWR will delay the installation of the intake cofferdam at Intake A until the complete removal of  
8 the construction cofferdam at Intake C (or Intake B, whichever was installed first). This will  
9 delay Intake A construction approximately 2 years under Alternatives 2a and 4a. By having only  
10 two intake cofferdams installed in the river at the same time, the resulting increase in WSEs in  
11 the Sacramento River will be 0.08 foot for the 100-year flood event and 0.09 foot for the 200-  
12 year flood event and, therefore, will render the impact less than significant. The 2-year increase  
13 in the construction timeframe for the intakes will not increase the overall schedule for project  
14 construction for Alternatives 2a and 4a.

### 15 ***Mitigation Impacts***

#### 16 *Compensatory Mitigation*

17 Although the CMP described in Appendix 3F, *Compensatory Mitigation Plan for Special-Status Species*  
18 *and Aquatic Resources*, does not act as mitigation for impacts on flood protection from project  
19 construction or operations, its implementation could result in impacts on flood protection.

20 Actions undertaken for compensatory mitigation would restore three freshwater ponds along  
21 Interstate (I-) 5, wetland, open water, and upland natural communities on Bouldin Island, and tidal  
22 wetland and channel margin restoration sites within the North Delta Arc. Compensatory mitigation  
23 would convert existing agriculture land on Bouldin Island to wetlands, riparian habitat, ponds, and  
24 grassland. For the I-5 ponds, it is proposed that the existing grasslands, riparian habitat, wetlands,  
25 and ponds would be replaced by improved grassland, wetland, riparian, and open-water habitat.  
26 Tidal wetland and channel margin habitat would be restored within the North Delta Arc. Appendix  
27 3F describes the CMP in detail.

28 Channel margin enhancements associated with compensatory mitigation actions would likely occur  
29 along migration corridors that also provide a certain level of flood protection for adjacent  
30 properties. Channel margin restoration would improve channel geometry, similar to what is  
31 currently practiced by USACE and other flood management agencies when implementing levee  
32 improvements. Channel margin restoration associated with federal project levees would not be  
33 implemented on the levee but rather on benches to the waterward side of such levees, and flood  
34 conveyance would be maintained as designed. Channel margin enhancements associated with  
35 federal project levees may require permission from USACE in accordance with USACE's authority  
36 under the Rivers and Harbors Act (33 United States Code [USC] § 408) and levee vegetation policy.  
37 Any restoration activities associated with compensatory mitigation would be designed, constructed,  
38 and maintained to ensure no reduction in performance of the federal flood project.

39 The construction and operations of water conveyance facilities would potentially affect tidal  
40 perennial aquatic habitat and alter hydrodynamics at Georgiana Slough for migrating Chinook  
41 salmon juveniles and would potentially reduce habitat extent and possibly habitat access for delta  
42 smelt spawning. Restoration of tidal wetlands is one approach to mitigate for these impacts. Tidal

1 wetland habitat mitigation would generally be achieved at suitable locations by reconnecting former  
2 wetland areas to adjacent tidal sloughs and rivers. Restoration would primarily occur through  
3 breaching or setback of levees, thereby restoring tidal fluctuation to land parcels currently isolated  
4 behind those levees. Where practicable and appropriate, portions of restoration sites would be  
5 raised to elevations that would support tidal marsh vegetation following levee breaching.

6 Depending on the location of tidal wetland restoration, it may be necessary to construct an entirely  
7 new flood control levee along portions of the project perimeter to protect adjacent properties. This  
8 new flood control levee could affect WSEs in the adjacent waterbody, although the final design  
9 would ensure that resulting WSEs do not increase by more than 0.1 foot relative to existing  
10 conditions. Any restoration activities associated with tidal wetlands would be designed, constructed,  
11 and maintained to ensure no reduction in channel performance.

12 Accordingly, implementation of compensatory mitigation combined with the project alternatives  
13 would not change the overall impact conclusion of less than significant.

#### 14 Other Mitigation Measures

15 Other mitigation measures proposed would not have impacts on increased WSEs because a  
16 temporary levee would be constructed to provide equivalent or higher level of flood protection to  
17 adjacent properties as the existing SPFC levee and allow the intake facilities to be constructed along  
18 the Sacramento River while maintaining continuous flood protection. Other mitigation measures  
19 would be implemented in accordance with USACE criteria specifically to maintain flood protection  
20 and limit the rise of maximum WSEs to within the original design profile. Therefore, implementation  
21 of mitigation measures is unlikely to cause substantial increase in WSE, and there would be no  
22 impact.

23 Overall, increased WSE impacts for construction of compensatory mitigation and implementation of  
24 other mitigation measures, combined with project alternatives, would not change the impact  
25 conclusion of less than significant for Alternatives 1, 2b, 2c, 3, 4b, 4c, and 5 and less than significant  
26 with mitigation for Alternatives 2a and 4a.

#### 27 **Impact FP-2: Alter the Existing Drainage Pattern of the Site or Area, including through the** 28 **Alteration of the Course of a Stream or River, or Substantially Increase the Rate or Amount of** 29 **Surface Runoff in a Manner That Would Result in Flooding On- or Off-Site or Impede or** 30 **Redirect Flood Flows**

#### 31 ***All Project Alternatives***

32 All nine alternatives (i.e., Alternatives 1, 2a, 2b, 2c, 3, 4a, 4b, 4c, and 5) would have similar impact  
33 levels and are discussed together. This impact analysis discusses potential impacts on flood  
34 protection that could result from the project alternatives when compared to existing conditions.  
35 Because the area being evaluated for this impact does not receive protection from the SPFC, the  
36 project alternatives and existing conditions are both evaluated under 2020 conditions, similar to the  
37 other resource areas in the Draft EIR. Appendix 7A presents potential impacts on flood protection  
38 that could result from the project alternatives under future conditions.

1        Project Construction

2        Construction of the earthen embankments, pumping plants, levees, tunnels, tunnel shafts, forebay,  
3        and access roads would require excavation, grading, or stockpiling at project facility sites or at  
4        temporary worksites. In addition, site grading needed to construct any of the proposed facilities has  
5        the potential to block, reroute, or temporarily detain and impound surface water in existing  
6        drainages and velocities.

7        All project features would be constructed to not increase peak runoff flows into adjacent storm  
8        drains, drainage ditches, rivers, or sloughs. At the proposed north Delta intakes, tunnel shafts,  
9        Southern Complex, and Bethany Complex, all water from dewatering (i.e., groundwater removal)  
10       activities and stormwater runoff would be collected, treated, and stored on-site to reduce the need  
11       for off-site water sources (Chapter 3 and Chapter 8, *Groundwater*). On-site reuse and storage would  
12       be maximized to reduce peak runoff rate from project construction sites. If additional stored water  
13       is not needed, the treated runoff flows would be released in a manner that would not increase peak  
14       flow rates in local drainage channels or rivers on-site. Dispersion facilities would be used to reduce  
15       the potential for channel erosion due to the discharge of dewatering or stormwater runoff flows. The  
16       discharge rates of water collected during construction would be relatively small compared to the  
17       capacities of most of the Delta channels where discharges would occur. Permits for the discharges  
18       would be obtained from the Regional Water Quality Control Board or the State Water Resources  
19       Control Board (State Water Board).

20       Shallow, localized flooding has historically occurred at the sites of the proposed north Delta intakes  
21       due to natural depressions. This flooding could be exacerbated during storm and high-water events  
22       and may be due to stormwater runoff, increased groundwater levels, or through-seepage in levee  
23       and railroad embankments.

24       For all intake locations, drainage and irrigation would be rerouted to accommodate the project  
25       footprint. Similar to the dewatering activities described above, project facilities would be designed  
26       to capture runoff on-site to minimize off-site impacts during construction and operation. The project  
27       alternatives include drainage and pump enhancements to ensure intake facilities would not be  
28       subject to localized flooding during operation. During construction, the local drainage at intake  
29       facility sites would be managed to minimize local flooding through installing temporary pumps if  
30       necessary to allow continued construction activities.

31       These temporary changes in drainage would be minimized, and in some cases avoided, by  
32       construction of new or modified drainage facilities, as described in Chapter 3. Drainage studies, as  
33       part of the final design, would be prepared for each construction location to assess the need for, and  
34       to finalize, other drainage-related design measures, such as a new on-site drainage system or new  
35       cross drainage facilities. The project alternatives would include installation of temporary drainage  
36       bypass facilities, long-term cross drainage, and replacement of existing drainage facilities that would  
37       be disrupted by construction of new facilities. These new facilities would be constructed prior to  
38       disconnecting or crossing existing drainage facilities. Locations of stockpiles and other temporary  
39       construction features were selected and refined in the design phase to minimize flow impedance  
40       under flood flow conditions.

41       The project alternatives would include permanent facilities within the 100-year flood hazard area;  
42       these structures—such as the intake structures and surrounding levees and Southern Complex  
43       facilities, tunnel shafts—would be designed to withstand a 200-year flood event with sea level rise  
44       and climate change hydrology for 2100 (Delta Conveyance Design and Construction Authority

1 2022a:66). The levee systems surrounding each Delta island along the central, eastern, and Bethany  
2 Reservoir alignments where various shafts and facilities are located provide the first line of defense  
3 against flooding during construction. The levee reliability was evaluated in terms of its compliance  
4 with PL 84-99 criteria under existing conditions (i.e., year 2020).

5 The Southern Complex and Bethany Complex would include large construction sites and substantial  
6 numbers of personnel and equipment; however, these sites either have adequate levee heights  
7 (Southern Complex) or are not located in the potential flood area (Bethany Complex). The two  
8 Southern Complex tunnel launch shaft sites near the northern embankment of the Southern Forebay  
9 (Southern Forebay Inlet Structure Launch Shaft and Working Shaft) are already protected by levees  
10 that substantially meet the PL 84-99 criteria, primarily on the east side of the Southern Complex.  
11 The western side of the Southern Complex would be located on higher ground. In the area protected  
12 by levees, the time to flood in the event of a catastrophic failure has been conservatively estimated  
13 as being very short (Delta Conveyance Design and Construction Authority 2022a:68). However, the  
14 chance of levee failure is relatively low, and a sudden, catastrophic structural failure is unlikely at  
15 the Southern Complex due to portions of the levee system on mineral soil foundations when  
16 compared to Bouldin and Lower Roberts Islands. Because it is an area of reduced risk, further levee  
17 improvements on Byron Tract would not be warranted as part of the comprehensive flood risk  
18 management strategy for the tunnel construction corridor (Figure 7-1).

19 Launch shaft sites at Bouldin Island, Lower Roberts Island, and the Twin Cities Complex site would  
20 be much larger and involve more personnel and equipment than at maintenance and reception shaft  
21 construction sites. Accordingly, DWR would improve existing levees (Bouldin Island or Lower  
22 Roberts Island) or build a ring levee (at the Twin Cities Complex site) to protect workers, facilities,  
23 and equipment at those locations. These tunnel launch shaft sites would be active worksites for a 7-  
24 to 9-year construction period. During construction, all tunnel shaft pads would be constructed to an  
25 elevation at, or slightly above, the adjacent levee height, thus providing a high ground refuge above  
26 the local 100-year flood elevation. All launch, maintenance, and reception shaft sites would enact  
27 nonstructural flood risk management measures.

28 Based on the flood risk evaluation, tunnel shaft sites on Bouldin Island (central alignment) and  
29 Lower Roberts Island (eastern and Bethany Reservoir alignments) would be located in a higher risk  
30 category due to the combined effects of levee geometric deficiencies and potential inundation time  
31 and depth of flooding. Therefore, levee modifications on the inland side of the island levees would be  
32 constructed prior to construction of the tunnel shafts. Use of the existing levees with improvement  
33 would result in no impacts on existing drainage flows around the islands or within the island. The  
34 total size of the construction site and postconstruction site for the Bouldin Island levee  
35 modifications would be approximately 251 acres, with an additional 90 acres for temporary levee  
36 modification access roads. The total size of the construction site and postconstruction site for the  
37 Lower Roberts Island levee modifications would be approximately 30 acres, plus an additional 37  
38 acres for temporary levee modification access roads. To account for ongoing work by levee  
39 maintaining agencies, the extent of levee repairs would be reevaluated during the design phase and  
40 coordinated with the local levee maintaining agency. Levee modifications at Bouldin Island or Lower  
41 Roberts Island would remain in place after project construction, providing a higher level of flood  
42 protection to surrounding areas than currently exists.

43 Given the long duration of work at these launch shaft sites, island perimeter levee improvements to  
44 meet PL 84-99 geometric standards, as well as to address any known geotechnical weaknesses, are  
45 warranted to limit long-term flood risk. The extent and types of recommended levee repairs would



1 be refined prior to construction and in coordination with the local reclamation districts. The levee  
2 improvements would be initiated in the early phases of project construction and may overlap to  
3 some extent with the initiation of shaft pad construction at the shaft sites. However, if critical  
4 weaknesses were identified in these levee systems, remediation would be completed before shaft  
5 sites were constructed. Ongoing and continuous levee maintenance and monitoring would be critical  
6 to reducing flood risk at the shaft sites during project construction and would be closely coordinated  
7 with the reclamation districts. It is anticipated that levee maintaining agencies would continue  
8 making levee improvements to maintain geometric standards after repairs are completed and as sea  
9 level rise can be expected to increase in the future.

10 The exception to this flood management approach is the ring levee for the Twin Cities Complex site,  
11 which requires a separate evaluation. As described in Chapter 3, the Twin Cities Complex would be  
12 located on the eastern portion of Glanville Tract in an upland area vulnerable to overland flow  
13 flooding from the Sacramento, Cosumnes, and Mokelumne Rivers as well as Morrison Creek.  
14 Historically, Glanville Tract has been subject to flooding along the local levees and surrounding  
15 roadways of I-5, SR 99, Twin Cities Road, and Lambert Road. Glanville Tract is not fully protected by  
16 perimeter levees as the railroad embankment on the eastern side of Glanville Tract was not  
17 designed to perform as a flood control structure but is relied upon by the reclamation district to  
18 protect Glanville Tract from backwater flooding upstream of the confluence of the Cosumnes and  
19 Mokelumne Rivers. Therefore, a ring levee would be used to protect the Twin Cities Complex in the  
20 event of a levee failure on Glanville Tract. It would be configured to minimize impedance of flood  
21 flows from nearby streams, including the Cosumnes River, and minimize the inundation effects on  
22 the surrounding land during a potential overland flooding event within Glanville Tract. The ring  
23 levee and modifications to existing drainage features would convey floodwater around the ring  
24 levee to the west side of I-5 and eventually toward Snodgrass Slough. After project construction, the  
25 ring levee at Twin Cities Complex would be deconstructed except for a portion adjacent to the  
26 reusable tunnel material (RTM) storage area.

27 The flood effects analysis for the Twin Cities Complex site found that the ring levee would increase  
28 the 100-year flood depth directly adjacent to the ring levee by a maximum of approximately 0.3 foot  
29 for the central and eastern alignments and 0.4 foot for the Bethany Reservoir alignment, when  
30 compared to existing conditions with approximate flood depth of 3 feet. The resulting 100-year  
31 floodplain would increase by approximately 10 acres for the central and eastern alignments and 15  
32 acres for the Bethany Reservoir alignment. However, the flood effect is confined to an open space  
33 area north of the Twin Cities Complex site for grazing purposes that are subject to flooding under  
34 the existing conditions. The inundation would last about 2.5 days (Delta Conveyance Design and  
35 Construction Authority 2022d:Att 3-16, 2022f:Att 4). The flood depth of the narrow space between  
36 the ring levee and existing railroad embankment would increase by 3 feet with potential  
37 overtopping of the existing railroad embankment, compared to existing conditions; however, the  
38 flow volume is fairly low and the flood depth increase is mainly due to the limited space between  
39 Franklin Boulevard and the railroad embankment, and the impacts are localized to this area.  
40 Dierssen Road would be overtopped by approximately 3.5 feet under existing conditions and  
41 become unusable; the conditions remain the same under project alternatives. Modeling results show  
42 that the ring levee would not change flood depth west of I-5, south of the Twin Cities Complex site,  
43 or north of Lambert Road.

44 The ring levee would increase the 100-year floodplain by approximately 10 acres for the central and  
45 eastern alignments and 15 acres for the Bethany Reservoir alignment, in the open space to north of  
46 the Twin Cities Complex. However, this increase in the 100-year floodplain would affect grazing land

1 that is mostly inundated under existing flood conditions without the project facilities as well. The  
2 depth of flow with the project would overtop Dierssen Road by approximately 3.5 feet for all  
3 alignments evaluated. However, Dierssen Road would be inundated (to the same depth with or  
4 without the project facilities) and unusable under existing flood conditions without the project  
5 facilities. After the McCormack-Williamson Tract Project is completed, the hydraulic profile would  
6 be reduced approximately 1 to 1.5 feet within the adjacent floodway, which reduces the likelihood of  
7 flooding within Glanville Tract. As a result, the overtopping of the existing railroad embankment  
8 would not occur.

9 The launch site associated with Byron Tract near the South Delta Pumping Plant and Southern  
10 Forebay Inlet Structure would include two shafts—the Southern Forebay Inlet Structure launch  
11 shaft and an intermediate working shaft approximately 1 mile to the north. This site would be  
12 protected by levees that substantially meet the PL 84-99 criteria, and have levees primarily only on  
13 the east side, with high ground on the west side. Although the time to flood in the event of a  
14 catastrophic failure has been conservatively estimated as being short, the chance of failure would be  
15 relatively low, and a sudden, catastrophic structural failure would be unlikely because portions of  
16 the levee system are on mineral soil foundations and substantially higher ground elevations  
17 compared to Bouldin Island and Lower Roberts Island. For these reasons, further levee  
18 improvements on Byron Tract would not be warranted as part of the comprehensive flood risk  
19 management strategy for the tunnel construction.

20 The DSOD is the state agency with jurisdiction over the design, construction, and safe operation of  
21 the planned Southern Forebay for Alternatives 1, 2a, 2b, 2c, 3, 4a, 4b, and 4c. The Southern Forebay  
22 would be designed in accordance with the DSOD requirements for jurisdictional dams based on the  
23 anticipated maximum embankment height and storage volume. The embankments and spillway  
24 crest elevations would be established based on interior freeboard considerations mandated by  
25 DSOD and exterior sea level rise and flood condition data provided by DWR. The embankment,  
26 outlet works, emergency spillway, and their appurtenances would be designed to protect the  
27 forebay from the 200-year flood event with sea level rise and climate change hydrology for year  
28 2100 (i.e., 10.2 feet of sea level rise at the Golden Gate Bridge) as defined by DWR, including wave  
29 run-up and appropriate freeboard for the Southern Forebay to reduce risk of overtopping the  
30 embankment from external flooding. Riprap would be placed along the inside embankment slopes  
31 and native grasses would be planted along the outside embankment slopes for erosion protection.  
32 Seepage collectors and drainage layers would be installed within the outboard toe of the  
33 embankment. Within the Southern Forebay, internal WSEs could be higher than external WSEs;  
34 therefore, the embankments would be of adequate height to contain maximum water elevation,  
35 wave run-up, and freeboard on the interior side of the embankment (except at the emergency  
36 spillway location).

### 37 Postconstruction Effects During Operation

38 Shallow, localized flooding has historically occurred at the sites of the proposed north Delta intakes  
39 due to natural depressions. This flooding could be exacerbated during storm and high-water events  
40 and may be due to stormwater runoff, increased groundwater levels, or through-seepage in levee  
41 and railroad embankments.

42 For all intake locations, drainage and irrigation would be rerouted to accommodate the project  
43 footprint. The project alternatives include drainage and pump enhancements to ensure intake  
44 facilities would not be subject to flooding during operation.

1 The flood effect analysis for the Twin Cities Complex site found that the stockpile storage areas  
2 would increase the 100-year flood depth by approximately 0.1 and 0.15 foot for the eastern and  
3 Bethany Reservoir alignments, respectively, when compared to existing conditions with a flood  
4 depth of approximately 3 feet; however, the flood effect is confined to an open space area north of  
5 the Twin Cities Complex site that is subject to flooding under existing conditions with no effect on  
6 residential development and/or critical facilities (Delta Conveyance Design and Construction  
7 Authority 2022d:Att 3-16, 2022f).

8 The stockpile storage areas would increase the 100-year floodplain by approximately 4 acres for  
9 both the eastern and Bethany Reservoir alignments in the open space to north of the Twin Cities  
10 Complex. However, this increase in the 100-year floodplain would affect grazing land that is mostly  
11 inundated under existing flood conditions without the project facilities. The permanent stockpile for  
12 the central alignment is smaller than that of the eastern alignment and thus would have less of an  
13 effect in increasing flood depth adjacent to the facility during flooding. Modeling results show that  
14 the stockpile storage areas would not change flood depth west of I-5 or south of the Twin Cities  
15 Complex site. With the eventual completion of the McCormack-Williamson Tract Project, the  
16 hydraulic profile would be reduced approximately 1 to 1.5 feet within the adjacent floodway, which  
17 reduces the likelihood of flooding within Glanville Tract.

18 Permanent RTM stockpiles expected at some tunnel launch shaft sites other than the Twin Cities  
19 Complex would extend above the surrounding grades and would be planted with native grasses  
20 primarily for erosion control or to create a natural habitat area. Recommended treatments for  
21 permanent RTM stockpiles would include spreading topsoil, cross disking, and planting native  
22 grasses. As previously mentioned, the surrounding levees of these launch shaft sites would be  
23 improved to meet PL 84-99 standards and no additional analysis is required.

24 The Southern Forebay includes an overflow emergency spillway that would be used under the  
25 unlikely condition that the forebay water level continued to rise above the design maximum  
26 elevation. The emergency spillway would discharge flow from the Southern Forebay into Italian  
27 Slough, which flows into Old River. To accommodate this, a portion of the existing Italian Slough  
28 levee would be removed. New levees would be constructed to channelize and contain the spillway  
29 discharge flows between the outboard toe of the spillway and the existing levee along Italian Slough.  
30 The discharge channel and levees would be expected to settle and require maintenance over time.  
31 The design of the emergency spillway would accommodate the controlling event where 7,500 cfs  
32 inflow continues and the outlet structure was closed (Delta Conveyance Design and Construction  
33 Authority 2022c:1). In addition, the capacity of draining the Southern Forebay with the combined  
34 capacity of the emergency spillway and the outlet structure meets the DSOD requirements for  
35 emergency drawdown for minimizing the risk of catastrophic failure of the Southern Forebay (Delta  
36 Conveyance Design and Construction Authority 2022g:10). The discharge into Italian Slough would  
37 initially be contained within the slough's existing levees but would, over a short distance, converge  
38 with Old River. The connection to Old River and the broader Delta waterways would allow spillway  
39 flows to be absorbed during discharge.

40 The potential hydraulic impact of the Southern Forebay Emergency Spillway on the existing levee  
41 system of Italian Slough and Old River was evaluated using a 1-D hydraulic model. The change in  
42 WSEs was compared between the different operational scenarios (i.e., spillway releases of 3,000,  
43 4,500, 6,000, and 7,500 cfs) and the baseline (i.e., no spill event). The 7,500-cfs scenario exhibited  
44 the largest increases in WSEs when compared to the baseline for both the 100-year flood event and  
45 the mean higher high water event (Delta Conveyance Design and Construction Authority 2022c:Att

1 2-5). For the 100-year flood event, the 7,500-cfs scenario increased WSEs by 0.44 foot when  
2 compared to the baseline, with the affected area extending 2.47 miles upstream and 1.55 miles  
3 downstream of the spillway location. For the mean higher high water event, the 7,500-cfs scenario  
4 increased WSEs by 0.67 foot when compared to the baseline, with the affected area extending 2.47  
5 miles upstream and 1.94 miles downstream of the spillway location. Although the spillway was  
6 assumed to flow for 12 hours, peak WSEs were achieved in 2 hours or less for the modeled  
7 scenarios. In the modeled scenarios, the peak WSE was located upstream of the spillway location  
8 due to backwater effects from the additional flow entering Italian Slough from the spillway. None of  
9 the scenarios analyzed resulted in overtopping levees of the main Italian Slough channel or Old  
10 River due to the releases from the Southern Forebay Emergency Spillway.

### 11 ***CEQA Conclusion—All Project Alternatives***

12 The project alternatives would involve placing structures within 100-year SFHAs that would impede  
13 or redirect flood flows. The impact assessment uses a conservative approach assuming the ongoing  
14 McCormack-Williamson Tract Project is not implemented. The results show limited increases in  
15 flood depth and inundation in areas primarily used for open space/grazing that are subject to  
16 flooding under existing conditions. Therefore, the potential impacts from project alternatives would  
17 be less than significant because flooding would occur in a limited area, be of relative short duration,  
18 and would primarily affect open space/grazing uses. In the event the McCormack-Williamson Tract  
19 Project is completed, as discussed in the cumulative conditions (Section 7.3.4, *Cumulative Analysis*),  
20 potential impacts would be avoided.

21 Glanville Tract has historically been subject to flooding, particularly along the local levees and  
22 surrounding roadways. The McCormack-Williamson Tract Project, when completed, would reduce  
23 the hydraulic profile in the adjacent floodway by approximately 1 to 1.5 feet, which would reduce  
24 the likelihood of flooding on Glanville Tract. The conservative flood effect analysis for the Twin  
25 Cities Complex site, which is based on the assumption that the McCormack-Williamson Tract Project  
26 would not be implemented, found that the ring levee (during construction) and stockpile storage  
27 areas (during operations) for all project alternatives would increase the 100-year flood depth of 3  
28 feet under the existing conditions by a maximum of approximately 0.4 foot and would increase the  
29 100-year floodplain by approximately 15 acres in open space for grazing purposes only. The flood  
30 effect analysis also found that stockpile storage areas (during operations) for all project alternatives  
31 would increase the 100-year flood depth by a maximum of approximately 0.1 foot of 3 feet under the  
32 existing conditions and would increase the 100-year floodplain by approximately 4 acres in open  
33 space for grazing purposes only. Based on the limited increases in flood depth and inundated areas  
34 and the fact that the McCormack-Williamson Tract Project is being implemented, this impact would  
35 be less than significant for all project alternatives.

### 36 ***Mitigation Impacts***

#### 37 *Compensatory Mitigation*

38 Although the CMP described in Appendix 3F does not act as mitigation for impacts on flood  
39 protection from project construction or operations, its implementation could result in impacts on  
40 flood protection.

41 Actions undertaken for compensatory mitigation would restore three freshwater ponds along I-5,  
42 wetland, open water, and upland natural communities on Bouldin Island, and tidal wetland and

1 channel margin restoration sites in the North Delta Arc, as described in Appendix 3F. Compensatory  
2 mitigation would convert existing agriculture land on Bouldin Island to wetlands, riparian habitat,  
3 ponds, and grassland. For the I- 5 ponds, it is proposed that the existing grasslands, riparian habitat,  
4 wetlands, and ponds would be replaced by improved grassland, wetland, riparian, and open-water  
5 habitat. Tidal wetland and channel margin habitat would be restored within the North Delta Arc.  
6 The CMP is described in detail in Appendix 3F.

7 Channel margin enhancements associated with compensatory mitigation actions would likely occur  
8 along migration corridors that also provide a certain level of flood protection for adjacent  
9 properties. Channel margin restoration would improve channel geometry, similar to what is  
10 currently practiced by USACE and other flood management agencies when implementing levee  
11 improvements. Channel margin restoration associated with federal project levees would not be  
12 implemented on the levee but rather on benches to the waterward side of such levees, and flood  
13 conveyance would be maintained as designed. Channel margin enhancements associated with  
14 federal project levees may require permission from USACE in accordance with USACE's authority  
15 under the Rivers and Harbors Act (33 USC § 408) and levee vegetation policy. Any restoration  
16 activities associated with compensatory mitigation would be designed, constructed, and maintained  
17 to ensure no reduction in performance of the federal flood project.

18 The construction and operations of water conveyance facilities would potentially affect tidal  
19 perennial aquatic habitat and alter hydrodynamics at Georgiana Slough for migrating Chinook  
20 salmon juveniles and would potentially reduce habitat extent and possibly habitat access for delta  
21 smelt spawning. Restoration of tidal wetlands is one approach to mitigate these impacts. Tidal  
22 wetland habitat mitigation will generally be achieved at suitable locations by reconnecting former  
23 wetland areas to adjacent tidal sloughs and rivers. Restoration would primarily occur through  
24 breaching or setback of levees, thereby restoring tidal fluctuation to land parcels currently isolated  
25 behind those levees. Where practicable and appropriate, portions of restoration sites will be raised  
26 to elevations that will support tidal marsh vegetation following levee breaching.

27 Depending on the location of tidal wetland restoration, it may be necessary to construct an entirely  
28 new flood control levee along portions of the project perimeter to protect adjacent properties. This  
29 new flood control levee could affect WSEs in the adjacent waterbody, although the final design  
30 would have a less-than-substantial increase on WSEs relative to existing conditions. Any restoration  
31 activities associated with tidal wetlands would be designed, constructed, and maintained to ensure  
32 no reduction in channel performance.

33 Some of the compensatory mitigation efforts would require developing temporary facilities, such as  
34 staging areas, access haul roads, work areas, and borrow sites. These facilities could involve clearing  
35 and grubbing, excavation, and other grading activities that entail soil disturbance. Unless measures  
36 are implemented to control erosion, these construction activities could result in accelerated water  
37 runoff rates. The hazard and potential impact on receiving waters of accelerated water erosion  
38 would be greatest in sloping project features, such as new and modified existing levees, particularly  
39 on the waterside.

40 At the Bouldin Island mitigation site, landside improvements would include the construction of a  
41 new setback levee behind and connected to the existing levee. The actual extent of earthmoving  
42 required for levee construction would vary significantly by site depending on the degree of land  
43 subsidence and the level of flood protection needed. The surface soils underlying the Bouldin Island  
44 site are organic and, therefore, subject to subsidence. The compensatory mitigation is not expected

1 to involve construction of habitable structures or significant foundations, but some of the mitigation  
2 efforts would entail construction of up to 5 miles of new setback levees on Bouldin Island, which  
3 may be founded on soils subject to subsidence. Subsidence of the levee foundation soil of the levee  
4 itself over time could cause levee failure and unintentional flooding. However, DWR would construct  
5 these levees according to Delta standards, such as PL 84-99, and maintain them to keep pace with  
6 subsidence of the underlying foundation soils, such as by periodically adding soil material to the  
7 levee.

8 As with the project alternatives, construction related to the CMP would be required to gain coverage  
9 under the State Water Board Stormwater Construction General Permit, compliance with which  
10 would ensure that there would be no excessive accelerated erosion or runoff caused by the project.  
11 Construction of setback levees, foundations for water control structures, and similar features would  
12 be required to be designed and constructed in accordance with resource agency and professional  
13 engineering specifications to avoid the effects of subsidence.

14 Accordingly, compensatory mitigation in combination with the project alternatives would not  
15 change the overall impact conclusion, and the specific impact on localized runoff and flood  
16 protection from the project alternatives combined with the CMP would be less than significant.

#### 17 Other Mitigation Measures

18 Some mitigation measures would involve the use of heavy equipment such as graders, excavators,  
19 dozers, and haul trucks that would have the potential to result in altering drainage patterns or  
20 increasing surface runoff. The mitigation measures with potential to result in altering drainage  
21 patterns are: Mitigation Measures BIO-2c: *Electrical Power Line Support Placement*; AG-3:  
22 *Replacement or Relocation of Affected Infrastructure Supporting Agricultural Properties*; AES-1c:  
23 *Implement Best Management Practices to Implement Project Landscaping Plan*; CUL-1: *Prepare and*  
24 *Implement a Built-Environment Treatment Plan in Consultation with Interested Parties*; and AQ-9:  
25 *Develop and Implement a GHG Reduction Plan to Reduce GHG Emissions from Construction and Net*  
26 *CVP Operational Pumping to Net Zero*. Temporary alterations in drainage patterns or surface runoff  
27 resulting from mitigation measures would be similar to construction effects of the project  
28 alternatives in certain construction areas and would contribute to drainage pattern impacts of the  
29 project alternatives. Mitigation measures would result in no increase of peak runoff flows into  
30 adjacent storm drains, drainage ditches, or rivers and sloughs. On-site reuse and storage would be  
31 maximized to reduce peak runoff rate from mitigation measures. If additional stored water is not  
32 needed, the treated runoff flows would be released in a manner that would not increase peak flow  
33 rates in local drainage channels or rivers on-site. Dispersion facilities would be used to reduce the  
34 potential for channel erosion due to the discharge of dewatering or stormwater runoff flows. The  
35 discharge rates of water would be relatively small compared to the capacities of most of the Delta  
36 channels where discharges would occur, and in accordance with applicable State Water Board  
37 permits. Therefore, implementation of other mitigation measures is unlikely to alter drainage  
38 patterns or substantially increase surface runoff, and the impact of drainage patterns would not be  
39 substantial.

40 Overall, the impact of altering drainage patterns from construction of compensatory mitigation and  
41 implementation of other mitigation measures, combined with project alternatives, would not change  
42 the impact conclusion of less than significant.

### 1 7.3.4 Cumulative Analysis

2 The cumulative effects analysis addresses the potential for the project to act in combination with  
 3 other closely related past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future projects or programs to create  
 4 a cumulatively significant impact on flood risks. It is anticipated that some changes related to flood  
 5 flows would take place—even assuming that future projects would be designed to avoid such  
 6 impacts to the extent feasible. For this analysis, the plans, policies, and programs listed in Table 7-3  
 7 were considered. These plans, policies, and programs were selected from a compilation of past,  
 8 present, and reasonably foreseeable projects included in Appendix 3C, *Defining Existing Conditions,*  
 9 *No Project Alternative, and Cumulative Impact Conditions.*

10 **Table 7-3. Cumulative Impacts on Flood Protection from Plans, Policies, and Programs**

Program/Project	Agency	Status	Description of Program/Project	Impacts on Flood Protection
Delta Dredged Sediment Long-Term Management Strategy/Pinole Shoal Management Study	USACE	Ongoing	Maintenance and improvement of channel function, levee rehabilitation, and ecosystem restoration.	Could alter the existing drainage pattern of sediment reuse sites and directly affect flood protection.
California Water Plan Update 2018	DWR	Updated in 2018, ongoing	Provides a framework for water managers, legislators, and the public to consider options and make decisions regarding California's water future.	Could modify surface water flow patterns and indirectly affect flood protection.
Bay-Delta Water Quality Control Plan Update (Delta Outflows, Sacramento River and Delta Tributary Inflows, Cold Water Habitat and Interior Delta Flows)	State Water Board	Planning phase	Would establish flow objectives for the Sacramento River and its tributaries, Delta eastside tributaries (including the Calaveras, Cosumnes, and Mokelumne Rivers), Delta outflows, and interior Delta flows.	Could modify surface water flow patterns, increase instream flows, increase minimum Delta outflows, and indirectly affect flood protection.
Delta Flood Protection Fund	DWR	Ongoing	Provides funding to levee maintaining agencies for their use to maintain and improve critical levees in the Delta.	Could modify surface water flow patterns or alter the existing drainage pattern and indirectly affect flood protection.
North Delta Flood Control and Ecosystem Restoration Project	DWR	Ongoing	Will improve flood management and provide ecosystem benefits in the North Delta area through actions such as construction of setback levees and configuration of flood bypass areas to create quality habitat for species of concern.	Will reduce flooding and provide contiguous aquatic and floodplain habitat along the downstream portion of the Cosumnes River Preserve.

Program/Project	Agency	Status	Description of Program/Project	Impacts on Flood Protection
McCormack-Williamson Tract Flood Control and Ecosystem Restoration Project	DWR	Ongoing	Will implement flood control improvements principally on and around McCormack-Williamson Tract in a manner that benefits aquatic and terrestrial habitats, species, and ecological processes.	Will reduce flooding and improve flood control and management.
Sacramento River Bank Protection Project	USACE	Planning phase	A long-term flood risk management project designed to enhance public safety and help protect property along the Sacramento River and its tributaries.	Could modify surface water flow patterns or alter the existing drainage pattern and indirectly affect flood protection.
Lookout Slough Tidal Habitat Restoration and Flood Improvement Project	DWR	Planning phase	Designed to be a multi-benefit project to restore approximately 3,100 acres of tidal marsh, increase flood storage and conveyance in the Yolo Bypass, increase levee resilience, and decrease flood risk.	While the project would breach and degrade an SPFC levee (i.e., Shag Slough), which would lead to hydraulic changes during flood events, it would reduce local flood risk and improve local flood control. Therefore, the project would not substantially alter the drainage pattern of the area; this effect would be less than significant.
Incidental Take Permit for Long-Term Operation of the State Water Project in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta 2020	CDFW	Ongoing	CDFW issued an ITP to DWR for long-term operations of the SWP.	Potential effects on flood management could be from required conservation actions and activities in the floodways (e.g., Yolo Bypass), flood control channels, or floodplain would, if necessary, be mitigated to be less than significant when implemented.
2019 National Marine Fisheries Service Biological Opinion on the Long-term Operations of the Central Valley Project and State Water Project	NMFS	Ongoing	On October 21, 2019, NMFS issued a final BiOp finding that continued operations of the CVP/SWP is not likely jeopardize several listed species, including Sacramento River winter-run Chinook salmon, Central Valley spring-run Chinook salmon, Central Valley steelhead, Southern Distinct Population Segment of North American green sturgeon, and Southern Resident killer whales.	Potential effects on flood management could be from required conservation actions and activities in the floodways (e.g., Yolo Bypass), flood control channels, or floodplain would, if necessary, be mitigated to be less than significant when implemented.



Program/Project	Agency	Status	Description of Program/Project	Impacts on Flood Protection
2019 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Biological Opinion on the Long-Term Operations of the Central Valley Project and State Water Project (Delta Smelt)	Reclamation, USFWS, and DWR	Ongoing	On October 21, 2019, USFWS delivered its BiOp to Reclamation on the effects of continued operation of the federal components of CVP and SWP on delta smelt and its designated critical habitat.	Potential effects on flood management could be from required conservation actions and activities in the floodways (e.g., Yolo Bypass), flood control channels, or floodplain would, if necessary, be mitigated to be less than significant when implemented.
Central Valley Flood Protection Plan	DWR	Ongoing	The plan lays out strategies to: prioritize the state's investment in flood management over the next 3 decades, promote multi-benefit projects, and integrate and improve ecosystem functions associated with flood risk reduction projects. The plan is updated every 5 years and is currently undergoing a 2022 update.	Implementation of the plan has improved flood risk management in the Central Valley. Implementation of the recommended plan has reduced the estimated expected annual damage and potential life loss.

1 BiOp = Biological Opinion; CDFW = California Department of Fish and Wildlife; CVP = Central Valley Project;  
2 DWR = California Department of Water Resources; EIS = Environmental Impact Statement; ITP = Incidental Take Permit;  
3 NMFS = National Marine Fisheries Service; SWP = State Water Project; USACE = U.S. Army Corps of Engineers;  
4 USFWS = U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.

#### 5 **7.3.4.1 Cumulative Impacts of the No Project Alternative**

6 The No Project Alternative in combination with other cumulative projects is expected to  
7 cumulatively affect flood protection. Ongoing and reasonably foreseeable future projects may affect  
8 flood protection; however, several of the projects considered in the cumulative impact analysis are  
9 being developed in accordance with project objectives to improve flood control and management  
10 (e.g., Sacramento River Bank Protection Project, McCormack-Williamson Tract Project, and Lookout  
11 Slough Tidal Habitat Restoration and Flood Improvement Project). Nevertheless, a shift in  
12 hydrologic patterns and sea level rise as a result of climate change would decrease flood protection  
13 and increase flood risk.

#### 14 **7.3.4.2 Cumulative Impacts of the Project Alternatives**

15 Construction of the project alternatives could result in alterations to channel conveyance capacity,  
16 drainage patterns, the rate or amount of surface runoff, or the placement of structures within an  
17 SFHA. However, construction of temporary and permanent levees would provide an equivalent (or  
18 higher) level of flood protection for the areas where construction is occurring and increased WSEs  
19 related to constricted conveyance capacity of the Sacramento River would be similar to existing  
20 conditions. All project structures placed within a 100-year SFHA would be designed to not impede  
21 or redirect flood flows. Most of the effects associated with these impact mechanisms are restricted  
22 to the specific impact sites and therefore would not act in combination with other projects.

23 While most of the projects considered in the cumulative impact analysis would not affect flood  
24 control and management in the study area, several of the projects are being developed in accordance  
25 with their specific project objectives to improve flood control and management (e.g., Sacramento  
26 River Bank Protection Project, McCormack-Williamson Tract Project, and Lookout Slough Tidal

1 Habitat Restoration and Flood Improvement Project). The effects of other cumulative impact  
2 projects on flood protection are not known at this time. The changes due to the project alternatives  
3 would remain small, beneficial, or localized and therefore would not be cumulatively considerable  
4 relative to past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future projects.